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Introduction: Behavioural game theory
Game theory is the standard method in economics used to analyse situations
where people or firms interact, for example, auctions, bargaining, cooperation,
markets with a small number of firms, and many other social dilemmas such as the
provision of public goods. Behavioural game theory is an approach to economics
that uses psychological regularities to suggest ways to weaken rationality assump-
tions and extend the motivational basis for economic behaviour (Camerer, 2003).
The three following essays are all contributions to behavioural game theory.
The first two essays are about bargaining, one of the basic activities of eco-
nomic life. Bargaining is the process by which parties agree on the terms of a
transaction, the distribution of costs and gains, and settle disputes. Many bar-
gaining processes are inefficient and result in agreements where both parties could
have achieved a better outcome (Johansen, 1979). There are a number of different
mechanisms that can improve efficiency in bargaining, of which one of the most
common is to include the option to let a third party decide on the issue. The
first essay is about how a third party mechanism influences bargaining. It shows
that, under reasonable conditions, the possibility of a third party decision will
improve efficiency in bargaining. This contrasts with the established hypothesis
of ‘the chilling effect’, where a possible third party decision reduces efficiency in
bargaining because a compromising third party motivates the bargainers to stick
to extreme positions during the bargaining process (Stevens, 1966).
There are many possible outcomes of bargaining, and a number of theories
have been developed to understand which outcomes will be reached under dif-
ferent circumstances. The second essay in the thesis is about how individuals
motivated by fairness considerations affect the bargaining outcome. Recent re-
search on fairness in bargaining has developed models that include fairness but,
in almost all cases, the analysis is limited to players agreeing on the same fairness
principle (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). In the second
essay, I extend the analysis to situations where individuals follow different fair-
ness principles. This model is used to analyse the influence of fairness motivation
on the possibility of reaching an agreement in bargaining, and to examine the
properties of the agreement. I show that bargaining between two individuals
who are strongly fairness motivated, but who disagree about what represents a
fair division, ends in disagreement. This result contrasts the standard bargaining
model with individuals who are only motivated by material self-interest, which
always leads to agreement. Furthermore, by applying the Nash bargaining so-
lution, I study the influence of fairness motivation on the bargaining outcome.
A fairness motivated individual reaches an outcome that is closer to his fairness
principle in bargaining against an individual who is only motivated by material
self-interest.
In the third essay, a trust game is used to study the social preferences of
prisoners and a benchmark group recruited from a representative sample of the
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Norwegian population. Economists have traditionally focused on how economic
opportunities affect criminal behaviour and have largely ignored the role of so-
cial preferences (Becker, 1968; Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Andvig and Moene,
1990). The third paper studies the social preferences of criminals and it is, to our
knowledge, the first to do so by conducting an economic experiment on a group
of prisoners. Comparing the behaviour of the prisoners with the behaviour of a
benchmark group, we find a striking similarity in the importance the two groups
attach to pro-social preferences both in strategic and non-strategic situations.
The pro-social behaviour of the prisoners in our experiment clearly contrasts
with their anti-social behaviour outside the lab. One possible explanation for
this cross-situational inconsistency is that behaviour in the lab is motivated by
different social preferences than behaviour outside the lab. The situational in-
consistency in behaviour could, however, also be seen as suggesting that social
preferences are of little importance, compared to circumstances, in explaining
criminal behaviour.
This introductory essay provides some background to the bargaining problem,
the behavioural assumptions used in the modelling, and the experimental method
that is used in the three following essays. These introductory remarks are meant
to both describe selected literature within the research area, and to briefly discuss
some methodological aspects of the research.
Bargaining
The bargaining problem for two individuals has been stated in the following way
by Rubinstein (1982):
Two individuals have before them several possible contractual agree-
ments. Both have interests in reaching agreement but their interests
are not entirely identical. What will be the agreed contract, assuming
that both parties behave rationally?
A prerequisite for bargaining is that both parties will have some interest in reach-
ing an agreement. Their potential gain from an agreement must be more than
what they can achieve in their best alternative to a negotiated agreement, oth-
erwise there is no incentive to start bargaining. Moreover, Rubinstein (1982)
states that some degree of conflicting interest is a necessary requirement for a
bargaining problem.
If people’s interests are identical or completely shared, there is no reason to
argue for a different outcome. However, a shared interest does not necessarily
lead to an efficient agreement in bargaining. Lack of (truthful) communication
can mean that bargainers are unable to coordinate their strategies such that
they achieve the outcome that they both prefer. This coordination aspect is
emphasized in the classical work of Schelling (1960) on bargaining problems. He
reasoned that the bargaining outcome will depend on the coordination of parties’
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beliefs and showed, through a number of small experiments, that the bargaining
process would converge to an outcome that is more salient than other outcomes
in a particular context. Such a focal point is an outcome that stands out from
the context by virtue of its simplicity, symmetry, temporal or alphabetical order,
or some other feature. Norms of fairness can be focal points in bargaining.
A bargaining problem is represented in the utility that individuals obtain from
the possible outcomes. In situations where the monetary gains and losses offset
each other, the utilities of these gains and losses do not necessarily offset each
other, for example, if one of the individuals is loss averse. Figure 1 illustrates a
typical bargaining problem where the utility of individual one is shown on the
horizontal axis and the utility of individual two is shown on the vertical axis. This
bargaining problem could be, for example, a situation where two individuals have
created a surplus from a joint venture. Disagreement arises over the ownership
of the surplus, which they intend to solve by bargaining. If they disagree, the
surplus is lost and they both end up with zero utility at the point marked with
a δ. They both have an incentive to reach an agreement within the grey area,
which is the set of all possible agreements.
Figure 1: The bargaining problem
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Note: The utilities of individuals one and two are shown on the horizontal and vertical axes,
respectively. Four agreements are marked A−D, and the disagreement outcome is marked δ.
The grey area is the set of all possible agreements. The bold line is the bargaining set.
Four of the possible agreements in the grey area in Figure 1 are marked A−D.
The bold line on the north-eastern border of the grey area is the set of all Pareto-
efficient agreements. An agreement is Pareto-efficient if no other agreement exists
that is strictly preferred by one player, and not less preferred by the other player.
The Pareto-efficient frontier connects all efficient agreements and is called the
bargaining set. Agreement C and D are both Pareto-efficient, and no reallocation
is possible without individual one obtaining less utility. Agreements A and B
represent conflicts of interest, where one individual’s utility loss is offset by the
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other individual’s utility gain. Agreement C is a Pareto-improvement to B,
because individual two obtains more utility and individual one retains the same
utility. Both individuals have a shared interest in moving from agreement B to
agreement D because both increase their utility by doing so. Agreements B and
D are egalitarian solutions where both individuals obtain the same utility.
In general, the bargaining set consists of many possible outcomes. The chal-
lenge for descriptive theory is to find the most likely outcome of bargaining.
Nash (1950) developed a theory that predicts a unique solution to the bargaining
problem. He characterized the outcome by four axioms that he believed were
reasonable premises to which a neutral third party would agree. The Nash bar-
gaining solution applies to cooperative games where a binding agreement can be
enforced, and it is independent of the bargaining process. For a bargaining situ-
ation where the parties are in symmetric positions, the Nash bargaining solution
gives an equal sharing of the surplus.
Since the 1950s, a number of non-cooperative bargaining games have been de-
veloped (Harsanyi, 1977; Crawford, 1982; Rubinstein, 1982). In non-cooperative
games, individuals play according to a specified bargaining protocol, that is, a
set of rules that govern the bargaining process. Each individual who is playing
a non-cooperative game is assumed to follow a strategy that lays out a course
of action for each possible state of the game. In a bargaining setting, a strategy
determines a player’s offer, given the history of the game. Moreover, the strategy
determines how the player responds to the offers received by other players in the
game. The most well-known non-cooperative bargaining game is the alternating
offer game. Under the alternating offer bargaining protocol, one of the players
starts by making an opening offer. The other player can accept this offer or make
a new offer to the first player. For every round of offers, the endowment shrinks
by a fixed factor. The game ends when one of the players has accepted an offer.
Rubinstein (1982) shows that the alternating offers game has a unique solution,
which, for identical discount rates, approaches the Nash bargaining solution when
the time interval gets smaller. The strength of the alternating offer bargaining
protocol is its similarity to many observed negotiation processes, which, from an
opening offer, typically evolve into stages where parties argue their cases and
make concessions to each other until an agreement is reached.
The weakness of many game theoretic models of bargaining is the high level
of abstraction that means they necessarily lack many aspects of real negotiations.
In non-cooperative game theory, many details of communication are left out, for
example, the ability to persuade the other party, the use of bluffing, and the
misrepresentation of interests. There are some disagreements about the extent
to which communications in negotiations are characterized by being manipula-
tive or by being primarily full, open, and truthful (Raiffa, 2002). Unstructured
bargaining experiments have shown that communication and social factors can
easily influence the bargaining outcome. Open communication often leads to
discussions about the fairness of different outcomes (Roth, 1995). Some of the
10
references to fairness can be rationalizations of self-interest or simply cheap talk,
but a concept of fairness cannot be manipulated if it is never invoked for other
than manipulative purposes. For fairness arguments to play a role in communica-
tion, individuals must act upon fairness preferences at some stage (Elster, 1989).
The analysis in the following essays integrates fairness into the individual’s pref-
erences, reflecting the view that fairness is more than cheap talk.
Bargaining models predict a high degree of efficiency in bargaining. The Coase
Theorem states that, under the assumption of no transaction costs and complete
information, the outcome of bargaining is Pareto-efficient (Coase, 1960). Data
show, however, that bargaining is often inefficient, involving costly negotiations
and ending in Pareto-inefficient solutions (Camerer, 2003). Figure 2 shows the
number of work days lost in wage conflicts in Norway since 1922. The figure illus-
trates the high costs of wage negotiations in the Norwegian economy during the
period before the Second World War, and the decline in costs over recent decades.
Both the development of centralized labour and employer organizations, and the
introduction and development of arbitration are important in wage setting in the
Norwegian economy (Holden, 1998). In arbitration, a third party, often selected
by the parties, has the role of a judge, and his or her award is binding for the
parties.
Figure 2: Lost working days in Norway due to work conflicts
-
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Source: Statistics Norway (Table 03629: Arbeidskonfliktar)
Arbitration is a mechanism for improving negotiation efficiency that has been
extensively studied, but there is no agreement on its effects on bargaining effi-
ciency in the literature. Since the 1960s, research has been concerned with the
‘chilling effect’ of arbitration on bargaining (Stevens, 1966). The argument is that
if a third party compromise the final offers of the bargainers, then they are better
off holding on to an extreme position rather than making concessions. Conse-
quently, in negotiations involving the fall-back option of a third party mechanism,
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the conflict level increases and resources are wasted in costly negotiations and
in the use of third parties. This ‘chilling effect’ has been found in a number of
experiments (Ashenfelter, Currie, Farber, and Spiegel, 1992; Bolton and Katok,
1998; Charness, 2000). The central assumption involves the behaviour of the
third party. Empirical studies of real arbitration awards provide mixed evidence
regarding whether third parties compromise on final offers or use fairness princi-
ples (Bazerman, 1985; Bloom, 1986). In situations where fairness principles are
important, a third party mechanism may facilitate the efficiency of negotiations
because players hold correct beliefs about which fairness principle a third party
may follow. The first essay demonstrates that negotiation under the fall-back
option of a third party decision improves bargaining efficiency.
Behavioural models
The development and application of rational choice theory has been a major
achievement in economics. In rational choice theory, individuals are assumed to
act upon preferences that fulfil requirements about consistency of choice. More
controversially, standard economic theory also assumes that preferences are only
over the individual’s own material gain or loss from a transaction. In addition,
rational choice theory requires assumptions about beliefs that people have about
the choice situation that they are facing, and about how other people may act.
The formation of beliefs is based on an individual’s current information and the
seeking of relevant new information. A rational economic individual chooses,
given his or her beliefs, the alternative that maximizes his or her preferences, as
represented in a utility function, subject to resource constraints such as money
and time.
Since the 1970s, there has been a growing number of researchers who have
questioned that the assumptions of rational choice represent actual behaviour
(Simon, 1983). An example of an anomaly regarding rational choice that is men-
tioned in the first essay of this thesis is that people tend to have a self-serving
bias. In their search for information, people tend to seek information that favours
their preferences. More generally, if people experience a conflict between prefer-
ences and beliefs, they will tend to adjust either their beliefs or their preferences.
Cognitive dissonance is a theory that says that the adjustment should happen
where the cognitive resistance is less, e.g., if your beliefs are empirically justified,
the easiest way is to adjust your preferences and degrade that option (Elster,
1983).
Rational choice allows for representation of a broad set of preferences such as
tastes, emotions, and norms. Research over the last few decades has extended
the standard model to include other types of motivation than pure material self-
interest. Three extended models that are widely discussed involve altruism, in-
equity aversion, and reciprocity (Becker, 1974; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Rabin,
1993). An altruistic motivated individual is willing to include other individuals’
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utility in his own utility function. An individual with an inequity aversion obtains
disutility from outcomes that deviate from some defined principle of distributive
justice, for example, equality. Reciprocity is based on the assumption that people
will repay kind acts from other people and punish unkind acts from other peo-
ple. Reciprocity is not related to the outcome, but directly to the other person’s
behaviour.
The second essay in this thesis is a contribution to the research that focuses
on fairness motivations to study the bargaining problem. Here, bargaining is
analysed in the situation where individuals have preferences regarding their own
material outcomes and they also care about the distributive outcome of the bar-
gaining. It is assumed that individuals obtain disutility from deviating from
their preferred fairness principle. The model developed in the essay allows for
individuals to adhere to different fairness principles, which is documented em-
pirically to be important in distributive situations (Frohlich and Oppenheimer,
1992; Konow, 2003; Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2007). A critique
of these models is that arbitrarily choosing principles can fix the model such that
it can explain one phenomenon, but only with a loss of generality. The choice of
which principles to include in a model is important. One source of principles is
the normative political philosophy tradition; see, e.g., Rawls (1971) and Nozick
(1974). The selection of fairness principles in positive economic models should be
based on principles that are shown to be empirically important to people. There
is a growing literature that empirically examines moral motivations, with links
to the philosophical tradition (Cappelen et al., 2007; Cappelen, Sørensen, and
Tungodden, 2010; Alma˚s, Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2010).
The development of models in behavioural game theory that include fairness
has, by a few exceptions, been restricted to players who agree on the same fairness
principle (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). In the second
essay, I develop a model that captures the potential conflict between two indi-
viduals who follow different fairness principles in bargaining. Fairness motivation
can influence both the possibility of reaching an agreement in bargaining and
it can influence the properties of the agreement that is reached. The first part
of the second essay studies how fairness motivation influences the possibility of
reaching an agreement. Proposition 2 formalizes the intuition of Elster (1989),
that bargaining between two individuals who strongly believe in different fair-
ness principles ends in conflict. This result shows the importance of considering
a plurality of fairness principles to understand many bargaining problems. In
contrast, Proposition 3 formalizes that if two bargainers follow the same fairness
principle, it is always possible to reach an agreement.
Experiments
In the last three decades, we have seen an increase in the use of experiments in
economic research. The use of experiments has been a catalyst for much of the
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development in economic models discussed in the previous section, but it is also
a source of knowledge about regularities in economic behaviour that only weakly
relate to specific economic models (Bardsley, Cubitt, Loomes, Moffat, Starmer,
and Sugden, 2010). The major advantage of experiments is that control of the
environment allows identification of the relationship between behaviour and the
environment. The following essays use experiments both to test economic theory
and to investigate behavioural regularities.
Economic experiments are normally conducted in a classroom where par-
ticipants are faced with game situations in which their choices have monetary
consequences. The use of monetary payoffs affects the outcomes in laboratory
experiments, primarily by increasing the effort from participants, which reduces
the variance of decision errors (Smith and Walker, 1993). Participants are seated
in separate cubicles where all communication is restricted throughout the game.
The game situation is normally described to the participant in a user-friendly neu-
tral language to avoid cues to specific responses. These measures are undertaken
to control the setting to avoid social factors influencing the results. In particular,
care is taken to avoid effects from interaction between the experimenter and the
participants. Characteristics of the experimenter such as gender, age, and per-
sonality have been found to influence the results of experiments. There is also a
danger that ‘the hypothesis held by experimenters can lead them unintentionally
to alter their behaviour toward their subjects in such a way as to increase the
likelihood that subjects will respond so as to confirm the investigator’s hypothesis
or expectations’ (Rosenthal, 2002). To reduce this ‘experimenter effect’, a double
blind procedure is used such that neither the researcher nor the other partici-
pants know a participant’s choices in the experiment. Experimental procedures
often allow for trial-and-error learning before or during the experiment in order
to make sure that the situations are clearly understood. It is argued that people
faced with unfamiliar tasks make impulsive choices and that deliberation and
learning are necessary for people to discover their underlying preferences (Plott,
1996). These conventions for how economic experiments should be conducted en-
sure that experiments are replicable and valid. Internal validity in experimental
work is assured by running all sessions identically in all respects, and drawing
participants randomly from the same population into sessions. Then, researchers
can make one change in the experiment design and compare the results of the
two sessions. Such differences are called treatment effects and allow for causal
inference.
The third essay studies the role of social preferences among a group of pris-
oners and a benchmark group by conducting a trust game experiment (Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995). Trust and punishment are key norms that reduce
the cost of transactions in the economy (Fukuyama, 1995). Many transactions
are performed over a period of time, so that one party must voluntarily place
resources at the disposal of another party (the trustee) before receiving a return
and, therefore, he is exposed to the risk of not receiving the expected return
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(Coleman, 1990). The trustee is trustworthy if he delivers on the expected part
of the exchange. The decision to place trust in another party depends on the
individual’s subjective beliefs about the chances that the other party will break
the trust. Misplaced trust results in a loss, but the failure to place trust in a
trustworthy party may also have a high cost in terms of gains forgone.
The following data are from a classroom experiment of the trust game, and
illustrate how an economic experiment can be used to study trust. Students who
attended courses in experimental economics at the Norwegian School of Eco-
nomics and Business Administration over the years 2006–2008 participated in
three sessions. The basic design of the trust game experiment was that partici-
pants were randomly matched into pairs. There were 37 students in the role of
senders and another 37 students in the role of receivers. Senders got an endow-
ment of $5 from the experimenter and could send zero or increments of one $ to
the receivers. The amount that was sent to the receivers were tripled and they
had to decide whether to return all or some whole $ portion of the tripled amount
to the sender. The maximum earnings in this game were $15, and the minimum
earnings occurred when the sender kept his $5.
Figure 3: Trust game experiment results
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Note: The broken line represents the sent amount, the grey bar is the total amount available
to the receiver, and the black diamond represents the amount returned by the receiver for each
of the 37 game situations.
The highest monetary rewards can be achieved by sending all the money to
the other player. The problem is that the sender cannot be sure that the receiver
will return anything and, therefore, he will be better off keeping all the money for
himself, which is the prediction of standard economic theory. Figure 3 shows the
results from the student experiment. On average, the participants were trusting,
sending 70% of the endowment. However, there were significant behavioural
variations around this average, with more than half of the students sending the
whole endowment, and six students keeping everything. The average returned
amount was about 80% of the sent amount, but here also there were variations,
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with the returned amount ranging from an equal sharing of the total earnings
to zero. We can see that some observations cluster around a returned amount
that equals the sent amount. In the trust game, on average, the sender earns
less than his or her endowment, whereas the receiver keeps the surplus generated
from the transaction. This pattern is quite typical for trust game results. The
trust game experiment (and other frequently used games) have been shown to
produce results that are robust for higher endowments, for repetition, and for
non-student populations (Camerer, 2003).
The traditional interpretation of this experiment is that the sender amount
measures the sender’s trust and that the returned amount measures the trust-
worthiness of the receiver. The trust game is considered an adequate way to
operationalize the phenomena of trust. However, it has also been argued that
the trust game does not measure trust, because there is no promise from the
receiver involved, and that, instead, the trust game measures willingness to un-
dertake risky investments (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004). The standard trust
game can uncover empirical regularities between different subject pools, which
suggest that there are some real differences in behaviour between the subject
pools. However, the standard trust game does not reveal the motivations of the
participants. People may show trust in this game because they are self-interested
and expect the receiver to return money, because they have preferences for an
increase of total income, or because they are altruistic. To identify motives in a
trust game, it is necessary to change the experiment design or to combine the re-
sults with other observations regarding the same individuals (Cox, 2004; Glaeser,
Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter, 2000).
Recent economic experiments with games, such as the dictator game and the
trust game, have documented that social preferences are important in explaining
behaviour in situations where decisions have consequences for others, and have
also indicated that there are considerable differences in social preferences both
within and across groups (Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, and Gintis,
2004). In the third essay, we report results from an experiment in which we com-
pare the behaviour of a group of prisoners with a benchmark group recruited from
a representative sample of the Norwegian population. The experiment consists
of a dictator game and two versions of the trust game: a standard trust game
and a trust game with punishment. Heterogeneity in the importance attached
to pro-social preferences could potentially be important in explaining criminal
behaviour because, typically, crime has negative consequences for others. More
specifically, if people take into account how their actions affect others before they
decide whether or not to commit a crime, then the likelihood of a person com-
mitting a crime would be decreasing in the importance he attaches to pro-social
preferences. Consequently we would expect criminals on average to be less mo-
tivated by pro-social preferences than non-criminals. We find, however, that the
prisoners are highly motivated by pro-social preferences, both in strategic and
non-strategic situations, and that there is a striking similarity in the importance
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that the prisoners and the benchmark group attach to pro-social preferences.
Group identity has been shown to be important for social preferences, and
both in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination are important phenom-
ena in some contexts (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). As prisoners could possibly
identify with the other prisoners in the experiment, there could be an in-group
effect on their social preferences. Therefore, in addition to single-group sessions,
where participants only interacted with participants from their own group, we
included mixed-group sessions, where participants interacted with participants
from both groups. This allowed us to study how prisoners behaved when they in-
teracted with non-prisoners. In addition, the mixed sessions allowed us to study
whether the benchmark group was prejudiced against prisoners. However, we
found little evidence of in-group favouritism or out-group discrimination. This
result suggests that prisoners do not identify strongly with the general prison
population.
In the second essay, a bargaining experiment illustrates the influence of fair-
ness on the bargaining outcome, which is used to develop a model of bargaining
behaviour by including a plurality of fairness principles. There is a long tradition
in experimental economics of studying bargaining behaviour, fairness, and differ-
ent theoretical solution concepts for bargaining (Fouraker and Siegel, 1963; Ochs
and Roth, 1989; Weg, Rapoport, and Felsenthal, 1990; Binmore, Swierzbinski,
Hsu, and Proulx, 1993). The experimental procedure used in the second essay
is a direct implementation of the alternating bargaining protocol that is used in
theoretical bargaining models. Because the experiment implements the assump-
tions of the theoretical model, we should expect that the experiment is clearly
within the domain of the theory, and that if the predictions of the model fail,
this is due to the assumptions of the model. Specifically, if bargaining theory
claims to be general, its predictions should also hold for contexts with produc-
tion, as in the second essay. A problem with this type of argument is that all
implementation of theory requires some sort of auxiliary hypothesis. For exam-
ple, economic theories are based on assumptions about utility functions, whereas
the implementation in experiments uses monetary rewards, which requires some
auxiliary hypothesis about the mapping from monetary rewards to utilities. It is,
therefore, not clear in this example if the results from the experiment mean that
the bargaining solution concept fails, or that the mapping of monetary awards
into utilities fails. Viewed in isolation, this is a problem for all applied economic
theory.
Bardsley et al. (2010) suggest that experiments on social preferences should
be interpreted within a broader research programme called the ‘preference re-
finement program’, where the predictive success of particular solution concepts
is part of the hard core and hypotheses about preferences are treated as open to
adjustments. This contrasts with the ‘applied game theory program’ that takes
hypotheses about preferences as part of its hard core and treats claims about
the predictive success of particular solution concepts as open to adjustments.
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Bardsley et al. (2010) argue that the individual experimental results should be
evaluated in relation to the progress of the broader research program.
In the first essay, an experiment is used in a slightly different way to investi-
gate the effect of a possible third party decision on the efficiency of bargaining.
The experimental literature on arbitration has used an approach where the ex-
perimental designs mimic the various rules that a third party could apply in a
real arbitration, such as conventional arbitration, final offer arbitration, tri-offer
arbitration, etc. (Ashenfelter et al., 1992). The effects of these rules can be
studied within the experiment, and the results can be used to improve the de-
sign of real arbitration. In some respects, this approach to experiments can be
more informative than theoretical models, and it has been used successfully in
the development of auctions (Smith, 2008).
A much-discussed issue within economics is to what extent the results from
laboratory experiments can be generalized to other contexts, especially to less-
controlled interactions. The extent to which experimental results allow for con-
clusions to be formed about behaviour outside the experiment is called external
validity. A typical claim against external validity is that the artificiality of the
laboratory environment creates behaviour that is not seen in the field or an un-
controlled environment (Levitt and List, 2007). To some extent, the laboratory
experiment may introduce artificial situations that would not generalize to other
environments, but the same problem exists for any empirical method. The selec-
tion of an appropriate method in economics for testing hypotheses and explaining
behaviour should be a pragmatic choice based on the standards of the research
community.
References
Akerlof, George A. and Rachel E. Kranton (2010). Identity Economics, Princeton
University Press.
Allingham, Michael G. and Agnar Sandmo (1972). “Income tax evasion: A the-
oretical analysis”, Journal of Public Economics, 1: 323–338.
Alma˚s, Ingvild, Alexander W. Cappelen, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Bertil Tungodden
(2010). “Fairness and the development of inequality acceptance”, Science, 328
(5982): 1176–1178.
Andvig, Jens Chr. and Karl Ove Moene (1990). “How corruption may corrupt”,
Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 13: 63–76.
Ashenfelter, Orley, Janet Currie, Henry S. Farber, and Matthew Spiegel (1992).
“An experimental comparison of dispute rates in alternative arbitration sys-
tems”, Econometrica, 60(6): 1407–1433.
18
Bardsley, Nicholas, Robin Cubitt, Graham Loomes, Peter Moffat, Chris Starmer,
and Robert Sugden (2010). Experimental Economics : Rethinking the Rules,
Princeton University Press.
Bazerman, Max H. (1985). “Norms of distributive justice in interest arbitration”,
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 38(4): 558–570.
Becker, Gary S. (1968). “Crime and punishment: An economic approach”, Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 76(2): 169–217.
Becker, Gary S. (1974). “A theory of social interaction”, Journal of Political
Economy, 6: 1063–1091.
Berg, Joyce, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe (1995). “Trust, reciprocity, and
social history”, Games and Economic Behavior, 10(10): 122–142.
Binmore, Ken, Joe Swierzbinski, Steven Hsu, and Chris Proulx (1993). “Focal
points and bargaining”, International Journal of Game Theory, 22: 381–409.
Bloom, David E. (1986). “Empirical models of arbitration behavior under con-
ventional arbitration”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 68: 578–585.
Bohnet, Iris and Richard Zeckhauser (2004). “Trust, risk and betrayal”, Journal
of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 55: 467–484.
Bolton, Gary E. and Elena Katok (1998). “Reinterpreting arbitration’s narcotic
effect: An experimental study of learning in repeated bargaining”, Games and
Economic Behavior, 25: 1–33.
Bolton, Gary E. and Axel Ockenfels (2000). “Erc: A theory of equity, reciprocity
and competition”, American Economic Review, 90: 166–193.
Camerer, Colin (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic In-
teraction, Princeton University Press.
Cappelen, Alexander W., Astrid D. Hole, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Bertil Tun-
godden (2007). “The pluralism of fairness ideals: An experimental approach”,
American Economic Review, 97(3): 818–827.
Cappelen, Alexander W., Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Bertil Tungodden (2010). “Re-
sponsibility for what? fairness and individual responsibility”, European Eco-
nomic Review, 54(3): 429–441.
Charness, Gary (2000). “Bargaining efficiency and screening: an experimental
investigation”, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 42: 285–304.
Coase, Ronald H. (1960). “The problem of social cost”, The Journal of Law and
Economics, 3: 1–44.
19
Coleman, James S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory, The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press.
Cox, James C. (2004). “How to identify trust and reciprocity”, Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, 46: 260–281.
Crawford, Vincent P. (1982). “A theory of disagreement in bargaining”, Econo-
metrica, 50: 607–38.
Elster, Jon (1983). Sour Grapes – Studies in the Subversion of Rationality, Cam-
bridge University Press.
Elster, Jon (1989). The Cement of Society, Cambridge University Press.
Fehr, Ernst and Klaus M. Schmidt (1999). “A theory of fairness, competition and
cooperation”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3): 917–868.
Fouraker, Lawrence E. and Sidney Siegel (1963). Bargaining Behavior, McGraw-
Hill.
Frohlich, Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer (1992). Choosing Justice. An Exper-
imental Approach to Ethical Theory, University of California Press.
Fukuyama, Francis (1995). Trust, Free Press.
Glaeser, Edward L., David I. Laibson, Jose´ A. Scheinkman, and Christine L. Sout-
ter (2000). “Measuring trust”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3):
817–868.
Harsanyi, John C. (1977). Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in
Games and Social Situations, Cambridge University Press.
Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, and
Herbert Gintis (2004). Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experi-
ments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies, Oxford
University Press.
Holden, Steinar (1998). “Inntektspolitikken – hvordan virker den og hva kan
oppnaas?”, Working paper Norwegian Ministry of Finance, no. 29.
Johansen, Leif (1979). “The bargaining society and the inefficiency of bargain-
ing”, Kyklos, 32: 497–522.
Konow, James (2003). “Which is the fairest one of all?”, Journal of Economic
Literature, XLI: 188–1239.
20
Levitt, Steven D. and John A. List (2007). “What do laboratory experiments
measuring social preferences reveal about the real world”, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 21: 153–174.
Nash, John F. (1950). “The bargaining problem”, Econometrica, 18: 155–62.
Nozick, Robert (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books.
Ochs, Jack and Alvin E. Roth (1989). “An experimental study of sequential
bargaining”, American Economic Review, 79(3): 355–384.
Plott, Charles R. (1996). “Rational individual behaviour in markets and social
choice processes: the discovered preference hypothesis”, in “The Rational Foun-
dations of Economic Behavior”, Macmillan, (pp. 225–250).
Rabin, Matthew (1993). “Incorporating fairness into game theory and eco-
nomics”, American Economic Review, LXXXIII(5): 1281–1302.
Raiffa, Howard (2002). Negotiation Analysis : The Science and Art of Collabo-
rative Decision Making, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John (1971). A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press.
Rosenthal, Robert (2002). “Experimenter and clinician effects in scientific inquiry
and clinical practice”, Prevention & Treatment, 5: Article 38.
Roth, Alvin E. (1995). “Bargaining experiments”, in “The Handbook of Experi-
mental Economics”, Princeton University Press, (pp. 253–348).
Rubinstein, Ariel (1982). “Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model”, Econo-
metrica, 50: 97–109.
Schelling, Thomas C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University.
Simon, Herbert A. (1983). Reason in Human Affairs, Stanford University Press.
Smith, Vernon L. (2008). Rationality in Economics : Constructivist and Ecolog-
ical Forms, Cambridge University Press.
Smith, Vernon L. and James M. Walker (1993). “Monetary rewards and decision
cost in experimental economics”, Economic Inquiry, 31: 237–244.
Stevens, Carl M. (1966). “Is compulsory arbitration compatible with bargaining”,
Industrial Relations, 5: 38–52.
Weg, Eythan, Amnon Rapoport, and Dan S. Felsenthal (1990). “Two-person
bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors game with infinite horizon”,
Games and Economic Behavior, 2: 76–95.
21
22
Negotiation under possible third party settlement∗
Sigbjørn Birkeland d.y.†
Department of Economics
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
15th November 2010
Abstract
The effect of possible third party settlement on negotiation behaviour
is studied in an economic bargaining experiment. The bargaining phase is
preceded by a production phase that allows for different fairness principles
to guide the division of the total production value. The experimental
results show that a possible third party settlement lowers the dispute costs
by reducing the number of rounds of alternating offers. In the presence of
a third party, negotiators make first offers that are more strongly related
to their production, which reduces the number of rounds of bargaining.
The production phase has an effect on the distributional property of the
settlements. In negotiations where third party settlement is an option, the
negotiation outcome shifts towards a more unequal outcome, more in line
with each person’s contribution.
Keywords: Arbitration; Bargaining efficiency; Experiment
JEL classification: C78; D63; J52
∗I would very much like to thank Bertil Tungodden, James Konow, Alexander Cappelen,
and Erik Ø. Sørensen for valuable comments and helpful discussions, and Øystein Dvergsdal,
Ole-Aleksander Greve, and Maria Tsujimoto Frengstad for research assistance. Thanks also to
participants at a seminar at the University of Bergen, the conference New Directions in Welfare
at St. Catherine’s College, Oxford University, and the 4th Nordic Conference on Behavioral
and Experimental Economics at the University of Oslo. The experiment costs were financed by
the Research Council of Norway, research grant 185831, and the Department of Economics at
the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen.
†Address: Helleveien 30, 5045 Bergen, Norway. E-mail sigbjorn.birkeland@nhh.no.
23
1 Introduction
Many decisions are reached in negotiations under the fall back of a third party
settlement. Civil disputes can be brought to court, disputes arising under com-
mercial contracts may be solved by arbitration proceedings, and conflicts between
branch managers can be decided by a senior manager. The main question ad-
dressed in this paper is to what extent the possibility of submitting a case to an
impartial third party for settlement influences the bargaining efficiency and the
distributional properties of the settlements. The effects are studied in a labora-
tory experiment with business school students. The negotiations studied in this
paper are such that two parties must agree upon the division of a sum of money
created through individually produced output. The bargaining process is costly
and may go on until no money is left on the table. I compare negotiations with
and without the option to unilaterally submit the case to an impartial third party.
There are three possible outcomes in the game: an agreement about a division
of the money, a final third party settlement, or a perpetual disagreement. The
game studied is based on the alternating offer bargaining protocol extended to
include the outside option of using a third party to make a final decision.
Experimental studies of sequential bargaining show that concerns for fair-
ness influence bargaining behaviour (Ochs and Roth, 1989; Weg, Rapoport, and
Felsenthal, 1990; Bruyn and Bolton, 2008). In these experiments the players are
asked to negotiate the division of a fixed amount of money over a few rounds
of offers. The experimenter induces differences in the individual discount rates
which, according to the standard model, should give an unequal division of the
money. The experimental results show, however, that players tend to favour an
equal distribution of money. Even in experimental situations where one of the
negotiators has all the bargaining power (dictator game), a third of the par-
ticipants typically divide equally (Camerer, 2003). The strong tendency for an
equal split in these bargaining contexts may be driven by the widely accepted
fairness principle of an equal split when no entitlement to the money exists. The
experiment reported in this paper is designed to create different entitlements to
the endowment through a real effort production phase before negotiations take
place. The experimental results show that a player with a higher production gets
on average a larger share of the money. In the presence of a third party, the
distributional property of the settlements shifts towards a more unequal outcome
that is more in line with each person’s contribution.
Experimental studies of arbitration typically find that dispute rates more than
double when conventional arbitration is introduced into negotiations (Ashenfel-
ter, Currie, Farber, and Spiegel, 1992; Bolton and Katok, 1998; Charness, 2000;
Dickinson, 2004).1 In the experiment reported here the introduction of an option
to let a third party decide significantly lowers the dispute costs by reducing the
1With the exception of Charness (2000), these other studies do not apply the alternating offer
protocol and the negotiation process is not costly, but money is lost in the case of disagreement.
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number of rounds of alternating offers. The reduction in the number of rounds
of bargaining can be explained by negotiators making first offers that are more
strongly related to their production when in the presence of a third party. The
introduction of a third party therefore influences both the efficiency and the dis-
tributional properties of negotiations.
More details of the experimental design are presented in Section 2. Section 3
contains a theoretical analysis based on standard bargaining models. The exper-
imental results are discussed in Section 4, and the relation to the experimental
bargaining literature is provided in Section 5. Some concluding remarks are given
in Section 6.
2 Experimental design
The experiment contains four phases: a production phase, a dictator phase, a
negotiation phase, and a question phase. Participants are provided with the basic
design of all four phases at the beginning of the experiment (complete instructions
are provided in Appendix A). There are two experimental treatments, and the
participants are randomly selected into one of the two treatments. Those that act
as third parties are also randomly selected among the participants. Third parties
do not participate in the production or dictator phase in order to not bias their
view. Instead, they spend their time answering questions on four hypothetical
cases that are similar in structure and information to the real cases that they
meet later in the experiment.
In the dictator and negotiation phases, the participants are randomly matched
in pairs and each person is involved in four situations in the dictator game and
four negotiations. Pairs are rematched between each situation. Participants in
each session are randomly seated in separate cubicles; all interaction between
participants is anonymous and made through a web interface developed for the
experiment (selected screenshots are provided in Appendix C).2
Payment in the experiment is determined for each participant by a random
draw from the four situations in the dictator phase or the four situations in the
negotiation phase that the participant has been involved in. The participant is
paid according to the result he or she achieved in the situation that is drawn. If
there is a third party involvement, the participant is paid according to the third
party decision net of third party costs. A third party is paid a fixed amount
of compensation by the experimenter, independent of his or her choices in the
experiment or whether the service is used at all. In many third party institutions
‘Dispute rates’ refers to the fraction of bargains where no agreements have been made after a
fixed time period.
2The experiment is programmed in Python, and uses a MySQL database and an Apache
web server application. The experiment is run on laptop computers that communicate over a
wireless local area network.
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such as commercial arbitration, a third party is normally paid by the parties for
the time used to settle the dispute. The choice of a fixed sum communicated to
the third parties upfront was made in order to make incentives clear and unbiased
with respect to the uncertain demand for their service in the experiment.
At the end of the experiment, each participant is asked to complete a form
using a code given on the screen and the payment attached to that code is trans-
ferred to the participant’s bank account. Matching of the receivables and the
bank account details is done by a person outside the research group who has no
other information about the experiment.
In the production phase of the experiment all negotiators produce individually
an output by copying text for 10 minutes on the computer. The production phase
has been designed to create individual entitlements to the money. Individual
production is rounded off to the nearest 50 correct words typed. Individual i’s
production value yi is equal to eipi, where the number of words typed is ei, and the
price pi is either NOK 0.75 or 1.50 per correct word.
3 The prices are randomly
distributed to players by the experimenter after typing has ended.4 The total
production value to be divided in a negotiation is equal to Y = y1 + y2.
There are at least three salient fairness principles, mn where n = E,L, P ,
which can guide the individual in dividing the total production value. The first
principle is strict equality which is simply an equal split of the joint production
value, mE = Y/2. The second principle is a laissez-faire principle which gives
each individual what he earns in the production mL = eipi, and the third principle
is a proportionality principle which allocates the joint production according to the
relative production of words such that individual i gets mP = (ei/(e1 + e2))Y . A
principle of proportionality under which the input–output ratio is equal between
people is often called the equity principle or the accountability principle (Konow,
1996). It is a widely held principle, especially in contexts of production (Konow,
2000).
In the dictator phase of the experiment, participants are randomly matched
in pairs and one participant is chosen to act as a dictator who decides on the
division of the production value, Y , between the two. The participant acting
as a dictator is given full information about both participants’ production of
words and the randomly assigned prices. Each participant is involved in a total
of four dictator situations, two as a dictator and two as a passive receiver, all
randomly matched pairs. The dictator game represents a situation comparable
to negotiations where one of the players has all the bargaining power and there
is no strategic element to the distributive choice. Information from the dictator
situations is used to explain behaviour in the negotiations.
3At the time of the experiment USD/NOK = 6.9
4Before the production phase all participants are told that they will earn money according
to the number of correct words that they type, but that the payoff from the experiment will
depend on the subsequent phases. To avoid incentive effects, prices are assigned after the
production.
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In the negotiation phase of the experiment, participants are again randomly
matched in pairs and they are instructed to bargain over the division of the
production value, Y . The bargaining protocol is an alternating offer bargaining
with infinite horizon.5 Both participants are induced with an equal discount
factor, δ = 0.96, such that the value of the production shrinks by the same
amount for both negotiators. Money at the negotiation table in round t is equal
to δt−1Y . One of the participants in a pair is randomly assigned as the first
mover and proposes an opening offer in the first round, t = 1. An offer from
individual i is an amount of money xi to himself and Y − xi, to the other party.
In treatment I, called the bargaining treatment, the second mover responds to an
initial offer either by accepting it and the negotiation is closed without cost, or
by making a counteroffer in the second round (t = 2) where the production value
is reduced by 4%. The negotiation is closed when one party accepts an offer.6
The pairs of participants are rematched between each negotiation and all players
take part in four negotiations. Participants are given full information about the
other participants’ production of words and the prices assigned to each in the
bargaining pair. Every offer that is made during the negotiation is recorded in a
table on the screen. Communication between parties is restricted to this minimal
exchange of suggested divisions of the total production value, and acceptance or
rejection of the other’s offer.
In treatment II, called the third party treatment, the bargaining protocol is
changed such that there is an additional option available during the alternating
offers. This is to unilaterally break off the negotiation and request a third party
settlement. Because this extra third party option is only available in the second
treatment and there is random assignment of participants to the two treatments,
the experimental design allows us to study the causal effect of introducing a
third party option. Using a third party costs each negotiator 5%. The cost is
independent of who made the request for the third party settlement. There are
no restrictions on the settlement imposed by the third party other than it has
to be equal to the available sum of money, so that no money can be added or
withdrawn. The third party called upon to make a decision is given all the rele-
vant information about the negotiation, that is, both negotiators’ production of
words, the assigned prices, and the full sequence of offers made by both negotia-
tors including who asked for the third party service. Negotiators are not given
5In principle, the negotiations could continue until the minimum offer of NOK 1 is reached
or the participants could use an excessively long time to decide in each round, never concluding
the negotiation. From previous experience with experiments of this kind, we thought these
events so unlikely that the participants were not informed of how such situations would be
handled. One negotiation lasted for 26 rounds ending with an equal split of the remaining
0.36% of the production. It took 22 minutes to complete this negotiation.
6Every time a choice has been made, participants are informed about the consequences of
their choice, and they are asked whether they would like to revise it before it is transmitted to
the other party.
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information about any decisions made by third parties during the experiment.
After all choices are made, the participants are given three questions about
bargaining and fairness (questions can be found in Appendix B). Figure 1 shows
the different phases and the two treatments of the experiment for the negotiators.
Figure 1: Experimental design for negotiators
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a computer for 
10 minutes 
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Beliefs about the potential outcomes of the negotiations and the third party
decisions are elicited during the experiment. This allows for checking whether
the outcomes are affected by mistaken beliefs about the outcome of negotiations,
for example whether the use of a third party is driven by mistaken beliefs about
the third party decision. Before the first mover sends the initial offer, he is asked
what he believes will be the outcome of the bargaining. The first mover receives
a bonus of NOK 20 if the guess is within a NOK 20 deviation of the actual
agreement made.7 In all cases where a third party settlement is requested, the
participant who requests the third party settlement is asked what he thinks is
the most likely outcome. Participants are paid a bonus of NOK 20 if the answer
is within a NOK 20 deviation of the actual decision made by the third party.
The experiment took place at the Norwegian School of Economics and Busi-
ness Administration in October 2008. Students from the first and second years
of the Master of Science programme in Economics and Business Administration
were invited to participate in an experiment. The invitation explained that the
experiment was voluntary, that they would receive NOK 100 for participating,
and that they would possibly earn more money during the experiment. A total
of 110 students volunteered to participate and they were randomly assigned to
one of six sessions, three sessions for each treatment. There were 28 bargaining
pairs in the pure bargaining treatment and 24 bargaining pairs in the third party
treatment. The 104 negotiators were paid an average of NOK 333 (USD 48.3)
for an experiment that lasted on average an hour and a half. The maximum
payment any student received was NOK 600. For the third party treatment, six
7To avoid any strategic behaviour with respect to final offers and the bonus payment, it is
made explicit in the instructions that a negotiator will not receive the bonus if that particular
situation is drawn for payment.
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of the students were randomly selected to act as a third party. Third parties were
paid a fixed compensation of NOK 300.
3 Theoretical analysis
This section discusses what the expected difference between the two treatments
should be based on standard models of bargaining behaviour. The negotiation
protocol used in the experiment is based on an alternating offer model with an
infinite horizon that has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome (Rubin-
stein, 1982). In the absence of a third party decision, the model predicts that
the first mover will offer δ/(1 + δ) to the other player, who should accept. In
the experiment, δ is induced to be 0.96 for both players. The first mover should
therefore offer 0.49 to the other participant, who should then accept. A low dis-
count rate of 4% is chosen in order to reduce the first mover advantage. The
Rubinstein model predicts an outcome of the negotiations close to an equal split
with no variation. An agreement made in the first round is costless and efficient.
The model is based on both players having standard preferences, which are com-
mon knowledge among the players. For small payoffs the utility function can
be assumed to be linear in payoffs representing risk neutrality. The production
phase does not enter into the model, which is based on a given endowment to
negotiate over.
The influence of a third party on the negotiations will depend upon the rules
that govern the third party mechanism and the assumptions about the third
party behaviour. Here, negotiators can unilaterally submit the case for a binding
third party decision in any round during the negotiations. A third party can
implement any settlement of the contested amount, but he cannot add or subtract
money. There are different hypotheses about how impartial third parties reach
decisions. Many papers on arbitration assume that the arbitrator will compromise
the final positions of the negotiators. Negotiators will in such a situation tend
to make large demands and small concessions in order to offset the compromise
decision of the arbitrator. Such behaviour would predict increased dispute rates
in negotiations under a possible third party settlement. On the other hand, if
a third party follows a fairness principle in the allocation decision, the effect on
dispute rates may be different. Among the papers that study arbitrator behaviour
empirically, mostly in labour disputes, Bazerman (1985) finds that arbitrators
consistently apply principles in the decisions across different cases, and that there
is variation among arbitrators in which principle they apply, while Bloom (1986)
finds more evidence of compromising behaviour among arbitrators.
Submitting the case to a third party for settlement is an outside option. In
situations where negotiators know with certainty what principle the third party
will use, a rational negotiator with standard preferences should submit the case
for a third party decision when the payoff from a third party settlement net
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of costs is greater than the payoff that would be the outcome of a negotiation.
Because the Rubinstein model predicts an almost equal split, the outside option
will be an empty threat for both players if it is common knowledge that the third
party follows an egalitarian principle. This is because of the cost of using a third
party. Hence, if the Rubinstein model predicts correctly the behaviour of the
players, there should be no difference between the treatments; all negotiations
should end in the first round with an equal split of the money.
If the third party is known to follow either a proportionality or a laissez-faire
principle, the outcome will depend upon the application of these principles in
the specific situation facing the negotiators in the experiment. In a few cases the
production and the price are the same for both negotiators, and an application of
any of the fairness principles will then lead to the same answer—an equal split.
However, in most situations where there are differences in the number of words
produced or the prices assigned, the application of these principles gives more
money to one of the parties. This party could then use this as a credible threat
to get more money out of the negotiation. The other party should recognize
the credible threat and agree on a settlement that follows the principle of the
third party. Hence, if both negotiators know that the third party follows a pro-
portionality or laissez-faire principle, we should expect differences between the
treatments. The distributional properties of the bargaining outcome should on
average be more unequal, reflecting the fact that self-interested negotiators have
a credible outside option threat.
If there is uncertainty about the third party decision then the negotiators
would take this into account. There is an expected gain from submitting the case
to a third party if the expected outcome net of cost is higher than the outcome
from a bargaining agreement. Uncertainty about third party principles should
not in itself change the conclusion about the expected differences between the
treatments.
Rational negotiators with perfect information should agree in the first round,
independently of their preferences and the presence or absence of a third party.
An agreement in the first round is Pareto efficient. A third party may influence
the distribution of the negotiation outcome, but he should not influence bargain-
ing efficiency. Third party arbitration is a costly mechanism; the threat of using
it should be sufficient to influence the outcome and no actual use should there-
fore be observed. However, in many experiments negotiators use multiple rounds
of offers and counteroffers to reach an agreement. Such inefficiencies in nego-
tiations could arise from bounded rationality and uncertainty. The Rubinstein
(1982) solution relies on rationality in the sense that the parties should be able
to solve the problem using backward deduction. It is however well known that
participants in experiments, for example the centipede game, fail in the use of
backward deduction logic (Camerer, 2003). Uncertainty with respect to the other
players’ preferences or motives could also create more rounds of negotiations be-
cause negotiators use costly delays to signal to the other party information about
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their own reservation value (Ochs and Roth, 1989). Because participants are
randomly assigned to the two treatments, bounded rationality and signalling are
not expected to cause differences in efficiency between the treatments.
4 Experimental results
The experimental results show that both the bargaining efficiency and the distri-
butional properties of the outcome are influenced by the introduction of a possible
third party settlement. The 208 negotiations are summarized for the two treat-
ments in Figure 2. Each point on the graph on the left represents an agreement
from the bargaining treatment with person A’s share of the total production value
on the horizontal axis and person B’s share on the vertical axis. Each point on
the graph on the right represents a settlement from the treatment with an option
to submit the case to a third party, including 15 actual third party decisions. All
the points along the diagonal line from the upper left corner to lower right corner
represent efficient agreements, i.e. agreements made without costs. All the points
that are placed inside this efficiency frontier represent settlements where some of
the production value is lost during negotiation or by the use of a third party. We
can immediately observe that more settlements from the bargaining treatment
are further away from the efficient frontier, indicating a difference in efficiency
between the treatments.
Figure 2: Share of total production value
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Almost half of all the settlements are equal splits.8 There is a difference be-
8In order to accommodate rounding to the nearest NOK 5 and the small first mover ad-
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tween the treatments: 56% of the settlements in the bargaining treatment are
equal splits compared with 34% of the settlements in the third party treatment.
There is also a significant increase in the variance of the share that person A re-
ceives in the third party treatment (p < 0.001, Levene’s test). The most extreme
unequal split is a 20–80 split from the third party treatment.9
4.1 Efficiency in reaching an agreement
Efficiency in reaching an agreement is measured in terms of the reduction in the
production value and actual use of a third party. Dispute cost, c, in the cases
where no third party is used, is equal to one minus the accumulated reduction
in value from the discount factor (c = 1− δt−1, where t is the number of rounds
at the close of an agreement). In the cases where a third party is used, dispute
costs are also adjusted for the third party cost, α, of 10% (c = 1− δt−1(1− α)).
If the second mover accepts the initial offer in the first round, there will be no
dispute cost.
Table 1: Efficiency of settlements by treatment
I: Bargaining II: Third party
Rounds average 3.29 1.33
std. dev. (4.41) (0.75)
Dispute costs average 0.08 0.03
std. dev. (0.13) (0.05)
n 112 96
Table 1 shows that dispute costs are significantly reduced from 8% to 3% in
the third party treatment (p = 0.004, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). The average
number of rounds in the third party treatment is 1.3, which is significantly lower
than 3.3 in the bargaining treatment (p < 0.001, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). In
the bargaining treatment, about 20% of the negotiations continue for five rounds
or more; see Figure 3.
The results show that there is a significant improvement in efficiency by mak-
ing available an option to submit the case to a third party. This is in contrast
with previous experimental studies that find an increase in dispute rates when
a third party is introduced (Ashenfelter et al., 1992; Bolton and Katok, 1998;
vantage that follows from a theoretical solution, all agreements within a 47.5–52.5 split are
characterized as equal splits. Forty-six per cent of the settlements are within this bound.
9The average split is close to 50–50 for both treatments. Because of the random selection of
pairs in the experiment, a consistent application of any of the principles discussed in Section
3 gives an average of 0.5, but with different variance. The distributional properties of the
agreements are further discussed in Section 4.3.
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Charness, 2000; Dickinson, 2004). These studies typically find that dispute rates
more than double when conventional arbitration is introduced. (There are some
differences in experimental design between these papers that can possibly explain
the different dispute rates; this is discussed in Section 5.)
Figure 3: Rounds of offers in the two treatments
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The first offer is important for the negotiations because it sends a signal about
the preferred outcome and the aggressiveness of the strategy that a negotiator
will employ. The first offers could therefore have a strong impact on the efficiency
of negotiations. The number of rounds that a negotiation takes to complete in the
experiment is significantly correlated with the first offers (p < 0.001, Spearman
rank-order correlation). The main explanation of the reduction in dispute costs
is the sharp decrease in rejections of first offers when introducing a third party
(45% versus 19%).
There is a notable difference in the average share that person A offers in the
first round in the two treatments. The average share that person A offers in
the first round is 8% higher for the third party treatment compared with the
bargaining treatment, which is a statistically significant difference (p = 0.10,
Wilcoxon rank-sum test). The higher offers in the first round, when there is an
option to submit the case to a third party, indicate that there is a difference in
the negotiation strategies employed in this treatment.
In Table 2 the first offer from person A is explained by his relative production
in the pair, and his relative price in the pair. The coefficient for production
would be equal to one if the outcome was proportional to the production of
the negotiators, that is, if the proportionality principle was strictly applied in
the first round. The parameters are estimated using data for the first round of
offers by applying a regression with individual fixed effects. Production and price
are significant explanatory variables in the third party treatment but not in the
bargaining treatment, where the variables have very little explanatory power.
The introduction of a third party induces the parties to make first offers that are
strongly related to their relative production. Offers that are more strongly related
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to production will be closer to an equal split on average because the experiment
is based on a random matching of pairs with a different production of words.
This can explain the increased average share that person one offers in the first
round in the third party treatment.
Table 2: Effect of relative production and price on first offers
T I: Bargaining T II: Third party
Production -0.079 0.732***
(0.363) (0.083)
Price 0.047 0.063***
(0.050) (0.014)
Constant 0.538** 0.077*
(0.215) (0.046)
R2 0.03 0.65
n 112 96/81
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses.***/**/*: 1/5/10% significance.
Regression with individual fixed effects.
Figure 4 shows that there is a strong correlation between what a person ex-
pects will be the outcome from the negotiation and that person’s first offer.
However, in the bargaining treatment, there are a number of observations where
negotiators start out by claiming for themselves a much higher share in the first
offer than they expect will be the outcome, which is not the case for the third
party treatment. The presence of a third party induces negotiators to make first
offers that are more in line with expectations.
There are five first offers of zero to person B in the negotiation phase of
the experiment. All these first offers were made by negotiators who also offered
zero in the dictator game. This indicates that there is consistent behaviour over
the different phases of the experiment. A dummy variable is constructed in
order to check whether the dictator results have predictive power in explaining
the negotiation efficiency. The dummy variable is zero if both of the dictator
decisions are at the same level or higher (by a margin of at least 0.025) than the
lowest offer that follows from the application of any of the principles described
in Section 2; otherwise the dummy variable has a value of one. About one-third
of the negotiators make offers in the dictator game that are lower than what the
most self-serving principle tells them to do. This dummy variable is significantly
correlated with both dispute costs and first offers (p < 0.001, Spearman rank-
order correlation). It seems that inefficiency in negotiations is related to specific
types of players.10
10Charness (2000) finds that different types of negotiators are important for explaining differ-
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Figure 4: Correlation between expected outcome and first offer
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4.2 Distributional properties of the outcome
The distributional properties of the settlements also differ between the two treat-
ments, where there is more inequality in the third party treatment measured
with the Gini index.11 There is a significant increase in average inequality from
7% in the bargaining treatment to 12% in the third party treatment (p = 0.008,
Wilcoxon rank-sum test). This excludes the 15 observations where a third party
decided the settlement. If these observations are included, there is an even larger
increase in the inequality.
The production phase of the experiment has explanatory power for the distri-
butional properties of the negotiation outcome. In Table 3 the share that person
A receives in the agreement is explained by his relative production in the pair,
and his relative price in the pair. The effects are estimated by a regression with
individual fixed effects. Both production and price are significant explanatory
variables in the regressions. We see that the production coefficient is higher
in the third party treatment, which indicates that there are more agreements
closer to the proportionality principle in this treatment. However, a regression
with an interaction term for production and treatment (the third column) shows
ences in efficiency. He investigates the influence of social preferences in a bargaining experiment
with screening of participants into two groups based on their generosity in a dictator game (giv-
ing more or less than 30%). The sorting of participants into bargaining pairs reduces overall
dispute costs, primarily because of a reduction in these costs when two generous types are
paired together.
11The Gini index is zero for an equal split and one for a split where one player receives
everything. The result is robust for other measures of inequality.
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that the importance of relative production is not statistically significant between
treatments.
Table 3: Effect of relative production and price on agreements
TI TII TI & TII
Bargaining Third party Negotiation
Production 0.571*** 0.696*** 0.542***
(0.094) (0.113) (0.117)
Price 0.061*** 0.048** 0.054***
(0.013) (0.019) (0.011)
Prod. × treat. 0.156
(0.147)
Constant 0.149*** 0.102 0.136***
(0.055) (0.062) (0.044)
R2 0.418 0.45 0.439
n 112 96 208
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses.***/**/*: 1/5/10% significance
Regression with individual fixed effects.
Before person A chooses a first offer, he is asked about the amount of money
he expects to end up with in the agreement. There is no significant difference
between the treatments in the expected outcome. However, the inequality of the
expected agreement in the bargaining treatment is 11%, significantly higher than
the 7% for the actual agreements in that treatment (p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed-
rank test). It seems that the negotiators do not fully expect the more equal
distribution in the bargaining treatment. For the third party treatment there is
no statistically significant difference between the average expected outcome and
the average actual outcome.
The dictator game results show that the participants to a large extent also
chose to divide the production value according to each person’s contribution
when they had all the bargaining power. The coefficient estimate for production
is 0.8 in Table 4, which indicates that offers are made close to the proportionality
principle.12
12On average the participants offer 39% of the total production to the other player in the
dictator game. The average offer to the other person in this dictator game is higher than typical
dictator games where the average offer is about 20% of dictator endowment (Camerer, 2003).
The higher average offer in a context with a real effort production phase is in line with the
results of Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2007).
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Table 4: Effect of relative production and price on dictator decisions
Dictator
Production 0.802***
(0.135)
Price 0.052***
(0.019)
Constant 0.150*
(0.077)
R2 0.141
n 208
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses.
***/**/*: 1/5/10% significance.
4.3 Third party behaviour
In a questionnaire, all of the six participants who acted as third parties pre-
ferred the proportionality principle. Four of them also answered that they would
consider the strategy of the negotiators in their evaluation, saying they would al-
locate less to negotiators that were offering less than what was reasonable. Two
arbitrators said that they would follow a rule that deducted all the dispute cost
from the one who had offered less than what they perceived as fair, reasoning
that he was responsible for the dispute costs. Seven of the 15 third party deci-
sions were settled close to an application of a proportionality principle, and the
other eight seemed not to follow a strict interpretation of a principle. All the
third parties considered their role as an impartial third party to be to find a fair
solution, and only one mentioned that a third party mechanism may foster faster
decisions and improved efficiency.
The hypothesis that the third party mechanically compromises the final offers
is not supported by the data. The final offers seem to have little direct influence;
only in four cases are the settlements close to one of the parties’ final offers.
There are seven cases of third party settlements outside of the final offer from
the negotiators.
Incorrect beliefs about the third party behaviour, for example excessive op-
timism about the outcome of a third party award, could cause the use of an
expensive third party mechanism that would not have been used if the beliefs
were correct (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). In the experiment, the partic-
ipant who requests the third party is asked about what he believes will be the
decision of the third party. As only 15 cases here were decided by a third party, we
should be cautious interpreting this data, but the average belief about the third
party decision is not significantly different from what the third party actually
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decides. More than half of the participants’ subjective beliefs are within a 10%
deviation from the third party decisions, and there is no evidence of systematic
deviation of the beliefs about the third party decision.
4.4 Negotiators’ answers to questionnaire
To understand what the participants think about fairness and bargaining, a short
questionnaire was given to the negotiators after all the negotiations were com-
pleted. The first question given to the negotiators contains a brief description of
a negotiation problem illustrated with three examples, similar to the actual cases
that the participants experienced during the experiment. The answers show the
largest support among the negotiators for the principle of proportionality, fol-
lowed by the laissez-faire principle. Only 4% of the participants favour a strictly
egalitarian division of the production value; see Table 5. These numbers seem
to be biased by the actual experience during the experiment because the pro-
portionality principle is favoured by 77% of those who participated in the third
party treatment, and by only 57% of those who participated in the bargaining
treatment, and there is a corresponding change in the support for the laissez-faire
principle. The higher support for the laissez-faire principle in bargaining may
reflect the self-serving use of such a principle during the bargaining treatment
and a justification of this in the questionnaire.
Table 5: Preferred fairness principle
I: Bargaining II: Third party
Proportional to production 57% 77%
Laissez-faire principle 39% 19%
Equal division 4% 4%
n 56 48
The second question is related to whether they find it acceptable to use fair-
ness or power in negotiations. The question is the same as that used by Binmore,
Swierzbinski, Hsu, and Proulx (1993), who find that 35% say that one ought
to play fair. Here, 57% of the negotiators in the bargaining treatment say that
one ought to play fair compared with 69% of the negotiators in the third party
treatment. The rest say that it is acceptable to use one’s bargaining power. The
experimental design differs from that of Binmore et al. (1993), and the larger sup-
port for fair play is probably because of the inclusion of a real effort production
phase.
The third question relates to the use of bargaining strategies. Negotiators are
asked to rank four alternative strategies according to what they think is the most
important in negotiations in order to reach an agreement where they achieve their
own goals. The results show that having a strong opening position is given the
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best overall rank; see Table 6. Although fairness is important in negotiations,
players’ views are more balanced when a fairness strategy is compared with other
strategies.
Table 6: The importance of negotiation strategies
Rank
A strong opening position 1
Seeking a fair outcome 2
More bargaining power 3
Willingness to make concessions 4
n 104
5 Related literature
This paper is related to several papers that study arbitration in an experimen-
tal setting (Ashenfelter et al., 1992; Bolton and Katok, 1998; Charness, 2000;
Dickinson, 2004). They typically find that dispute rates more than double when
conventional arbitration is introduced into negotiations. An innovative part of
Ashenfelter et al. (1992) is the design where the arbitration decision is imple-
mented as a computer random draw from a normal distribution with equal split
of the outcome as the mean. A bargaining treatment is compared with an arbi-
tration treatment. They measure the dispute rates as the number of negotiations
where no agreement is reached after a fixed time period has elapsed. In the
bargaining treatment, everything is lost after a certain time period, and this is
compared to a forced arbitration settlement. The authors recognize that this ex-
perimental design implicitly raises the costs of no agreement compared with the
treatment with forced arbitration because the likelihood of receiving zero from
arbitration is very small.13 This is different in the experimental design used here.
The third party settlement is not enforced upon negotiators that do not close
before a deadline, but it is a choice for negotiators to call upon a third party at
any time during the negotiation. This implies that a negotiator can, if he believes
that further negotiations would be costly, immediately submit the case to a third
party and save negotiation costs.
Negotiation situations that facilitate the formation of different initial entitle-
ments have been studied by Ga¨chter and Riedl (2005, 2006). They find strong
13It is also the practice in these experiments to show the negotiators previous decisions
by the arbitrator in the form of draws from a normal distribution. This information has
potentially little value because there is nothing about the background history of offers or possible
entitlement claims that the arbitrator would consider before a decision is reached. In the
experiment reported here no information is provided about the arbitrators except that they are
randomly drawn from among the participants in the room.
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effects of entitlements on bargaining behaviour in an experiment where partici-
pants know whether they rank above or below the median answer to a general
knowledge quiz. They find that most of the participants choose to split the en-
dowment after a loss proportional to the entitlements that are suggested to them
before the loss occurs. Ga¨chter and Riedl (2006) find that proportionality is
preferred in a questionnaire survey and that equality is more prevalent in actual
negotiations.
The overall importance of entitlement in negotiations is confirmed in the ex-
periment reported here. The literature has shown that proportionality is a strong
principle held by many people in production contexts. The introduction of a third
party settlement option induces the negotiators to change their strategy so that
the offers are even more proportional to individual production. This paper adds
to the literature by showing that a third party settlement option can increase the
efficiency of bargaining in the sense of reducing the costs associated with rounds
of alternating offers.
6 Concluding remarks
The costs associated with transactions in the broad sense constitute a large share
of the economy, and the efficiency of institutions that facilitate transactions is of
great importance for economic performance (North, 1990). Substantial resources
are devoted to the formation and enforcement of contracts, and the resolution
of disputes through arbitration, mediation and, of course, the legal system. It is
important to build institutional arrangements that provide flexibility for people
to negotiate their own solution, but at the same time provide efficient mechanisms
to settle bargaining impasses.
The experimental results showed that both the negotiation efficiency and the
distribution of payoffs are affected by the introduction of a third party. There
is a significant reduction in dispute costs with the possibility of third party set-
tlement. The introduction of a choice of a third party solution reduced dispute
costs, primarily because it allows negotiators to cut short unfair treatment. The
experiment provided an example of a third party mechanism that reduces the
dispute costs, which is in contrast to the previous literature on arbitration. An
implication for the efficiency of the design of a third party mechanism is that the
option to submit the case to a third party should be available throughout the
entire negotiation process, and not only after a period of time has elapsed. This
ensures negotiators cut short unfair demands that would possibly lead to long
and costly negotiations.
The efficiency gain from an option to use a third party is accompanied by
an increase in the inequality of the distribution of gains, more in line with each
person’s contribution. The change in the distributional properties of the outcome
that results from the introduction of a possible third party settlement raises a
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normative question of whether it is acceptable to influence the settlements such
that other allocations are implemented than would result from negotiations be-
tween the parties without interference. In the experiment reported here, third
parties favoured a fairness principle that was supported by a majority of negotia-
tors. But the principle that a third party apply can run counter to the principle of
fairness that has a broader legitimacy in society. Dworkin (2006) argues that legal
theory at the adjudicative stage should require judges not only to uphold values
of efficiency and coordination, but also to look to morality to decide the law. An
important question then becomes the selection procedures of third parties.
Throughout the paper, we assumed that the parties agreed on the use of
a specific third party mechanism. To agree on the use of such a mechanism
during contracting is a negotiation in itself. It would therefore be interesting for
further research to investigate how the commitment to the use of a third party in
the contract phase influences the post-contractual negotiation behaviour under
possible third party settlement.
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Appendix A Instructions
This supplement contains all the instructions read to the participants during the exper-
iment. The four subsections follow the structure of the experiment explained in Section
2 of the paper. This supplement contains instructions for both treatments. For the bar-
gaining treatment, the instructions can be read by using all the text in square brackets
and deleting all the text in curly brackets, and vice versa for the third party treatment.
The instructions were given in Norwegian. The translation is by the author.
General introduction
Welcome to this experiment. My name is (. . . ) and I will guide you through the
experiment. The results from the experiment will be used in a research project, and it
is therefore important that you all stick to the rules that have been distributed:
• You should not talk to other participants.
• If you have questions or problems during the experiment, raise your hand and
we will come to you.
• You should not open other web pages.
If you breach these rules, you will have to leave the room. There will be pauses during
the experiment and it is important that you sit still and keep quiet during these.
You will be completely anonymous in the experiment. You will not at any time be
asked about who you are. It will not be possible for us or the other participants to find
out which choices you have made. You will be asked to make choices in several different
situations in this experiment. For every situation, you will be randomly connected to
another person in this room. Your actual payment will be determined as follows: we
randomly draw one of the situations you were involved in and pay the amount of
money you received in that situation. The choices that you make will not influence
which situation is drawn; it will be an entirely random draw and there is an equal
chance for all situations to be drawn. You should therefore think about each situation
as if it is the one that determines how much you earn.
When the experiment is finished, you will see a payment code on the screen. You are
asked to write down this code on a form that will be sent to the accounting department
at (. . . ). Employees at the accounting department will receive a list of codes and
amounts from us and match these with the payment instructions from the forms. This
is done so that nobody will know how much you earned.
{There are two different roles in the experiment. Most of you are participants
in negotiations, while some of you are randomly drawn to act as a third party. The
content of the folder shows which role you have been assigned. Negotiators have only
received text marked A or text marked B. Those of you that are third parties have, in
addition to the two pieces of text, received in the folder at your desk a booklet labelled
‘Examples and questions’.}
The experiment consists of four phases. I will now explain the main features of the
experiment. I will stop before we start a new phase and explain in more detail what
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you should do in each phase. In the first phase of the experiment, you should copy text
for 10 minutes in Word. You will be paid a price for each correct word you have typed.
In phase two of the experiment you will be randomly matched with other persons in
this room, and each of you in a pair will choose how much of the combined production
value you will distribute to yourself and to the other person. You will be involved in
four such situations of distribution.
In the third phase of the experiment, you will also be randomly matched with people
in this room. You will then negotiate about the division of the combined production
value by sending proposals to each other until one of you accepts the other’s proposal.
The production value shrinks by 4% every time one of you does not accept the other’s
proposal. {You will also have the opportunity to let a third person in this room decide
the distribution. The third party does not have any other tasks than to decide on
distributions that are sent to him or her.} You will be involved in four such situations
of negotiation. In the last phase of the experiment you are asked to answer a few
questions about the type of situations that you have experienced.
Introduction phase 1
The first thing [you] {negotiators} will do is to copy text from an official report that
is marked with either an A or a B, and which you will find in the folder on your desk.
You will copy the text into Word when I tell you to start. I will tell you when 10
minutes have passed and everybody must then stop. You will be paid for each correct
word you type. You may use the spellchecker in Word.
{Some of you will be drawn to act as a third party and you will make decisions in
particular situations if other participants request this later in the experiment. Those
of you who are third parties should first read through the four examples of negotiation
that are in the folder, and then answer the five questions in the folder. The answers
should be written in Word at the same time the others copy text. The third parties will
later be asked to provide answers to the questions on their screen. Those who are third
parties will receive 300 kroner for the job. This amount is fixed and is not influenced
by what you do in the experiment.}
{To everybody,} I remind you that you should raise your hand if you have any
problems or questions, and then one of us in the research group will come and help
you. You can now open a new document in Word and we will soon start to type. You
can start typing now .
Everybody must now stop typing. [You] {Those of you that are negotiators} should
now highlight all the text typed and copy it to the window in the Mozilla browser, then
click on the button marked ‘submit text’. {Those of you who are third parties should
not do anything now; however, you will later be asked to submit your answers to the
questions.}
After having submited the text you will see a screen that shows how much you
have produced and the value of your production. The production is rounded off to the
nearest 50 words. Half of [you] {negotiators} have copied text marked A, which is an
excerpt from an official report on the merger of the telecoms, IT, and media sectors.
You will receive one krone and 50 oere for each correct word you have typed. The
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other half of [you] {negotiators} have copied text marked B, which is an excerpt from
an official report about Norwegian performing art. You will receive 75 oere for each
correct word you have typed. These prices are randomly determined by us. Finally,
click on the button marked ‘continue’.
Introduction phase 2
[You] {Negotiators} will now be randomly matched with other people in this room. In
each situation of distribution you will not know who the other person is, and the other
person will not know who you are. You will be informed about how many words he
or she has produced and what price each of you has randomly been allocated. You
will then choose a distribution of the combined production value between you and the
other person. Remember that this is real money and the way that you divide the
money determines how much you earn and how much the other person earns. You will
be asked to make decisions in two such situations of distribution. In two other situations
of distribution, another person will decide how much he or she will distribute to you.
After you have registered the distribution, you will see a new screen where you are
asked either to confirm the distribution or to go back and change the distribution. When
you have confirmed your choices, you will receive a message that you have finished the
second phase of the experiment. You should then quietly wait for all the other people
in the room to finish making choices in their situations. On the computer you will soon
see a screen with the first situation and you can then start making choices. {Third
parties can continue and will later be asked to deliver the answers.}
Introduction phase 3
Everybody has finished the second phase and I shall now explain what you will do in
the third phase of the experiment. [You] {Negotiators} will this time also be randomly
matched with other people in this room. In each situation of negotiation you will not
know who the other person is and the other person will not know who you are. You
will be informed about how many words the other person has produced and what price
he or she has randomly been allocated. One of you is randomly drawn to make the first
proposal for division of the combined production value. The proposal will be sent to
the other person and he or she has [two] {three} choices: to accept your proposal or to
make a new proposal for division {, or to decide that the distribution will be determined
by a third person in the room}. New proposals are sent back and forth until one of
you chooses to accept the proposal {or to give a third party the task of deciding the
distribution}. Every time one of you does not accept the proposal for division, but
comes up with a new proposal, the remaining production value will be reduced by 4%.
{If you choose to let a third party decide the distribution, the remaining production
value is reduced by another 6%, in total 10%. Third parties will have information about
both participants’ production and negotiation history.} Everybody will be involved in
four such situations of negotiation.
In some situations you will be asked what you think will be the final outcome of the
negotiation {and how a possible third party will divide the amount}. If your answer is
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within a deviation of plus or minus 20 kroner of the actual result, you will receive 20
kroner in extra payment, with one exception: if you guessed the negotiation result in a
situation, and this particular result was randomly drawn, you will not receive the extra
payment for a correct guess but only the payout in this situation. You will also be
asked to state how certain you are about your guess. Your answer should be given in
terms of a certainty percentage, that is, a number between 0 and 100. It is important
that you write a high percentage if you are certain that this will be the result, and a
low percentage if you are uncertain if this will be the final result.
{Those of you that have been drawn to be a third party will within the next 10
minutes copy the answers to the questions from Word into the window on the browser.
You will also paste your proposal for division of the four examples from the folder.
When you have done that, click on ‘submit answer’ and you will be asked to wait until
possible situations arise in which you are asked to decide. After a short period of time
you will see these situations on the screen and you can then start to decide on the
distributions.}
On the computer [you] {negotiators} will soon see a new screen with the first
situation and you can then start to negotiate. When the situation is accepted {or one
of you has chosen to have a third party decide the situation}, you will automatically
get a new situation to negotiate. When you have finished all the negotiation situations,
you will be asked to wait until everybody has finished their choices.
Introduction phase 4
Everybody has finished and we will soon draw the situation that will decide your
payment from this experiment. First, we ask you to answer a few questions. Soon you
will see a new screen with information about the first question. You should click on
the button marked ‘go forward’ when you have read the information and thereafter you
should answer all the questions.
Closing and payment
Everybody has now answered the questions. You will soon see a screen that informs
you about which situation has randomly been drawn, and how much you earned in this
situation. This screen will be open for 45 seconds. Thereafter you will automatically
be forwarded to a new screen, which only contains a payment code.
Everybody now has a screen with the payment code. Write down this payment
code on the form that you find in the folder next to you. On the form also write down
your name and bank account details. Put the form in the envelope and place it in the
box by the door when you leave the room.
The experiment is now finished and, on behalf of the research team, I thank you
again for your participation in this experiment.
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Appendix B Questionnaire
This supplement contains questions given to negotiators after the experiment had ended.
The questionnaire was given in Norwegian. The translation is by the author.
Information
Person A and person B have produced a good or a service with a total value of 1000
kroner. The value of A’s and B’s production is determined by how much effort they have
exerted and the price that they receive for what they have produced. The individual
effort is determined both by how hard each has worked and by the individuals’ skill in
this type of work. The price is randomly determined and cannot be influenced by the
individual.
Below you can see an example of such a situation. Click on the button below to see
more examples. You will thereafter be asked to state what you think is the fairest way
of dividing the combined production value. Note that the combined production value
in all of the examples is 1000 kroner.
Production You The other person
Effort 200 units 200 units
Price of effort 4 kr 1 kr
Production value 800 kr 200 kr
Table 7: Example 1
Production You The other person
Effort 800 units 200 units
Price of effort 1 kr 1 kr
Production value 800 kr 200 kr
Table 8: Example 2
Production You The other person
Effort 150 units 400 units
Price of effort 4 kr 1 kr
Production value 600 kr 400 kr
Table 9: Example 3
Question 1
Now mark the principle that you think gives the fairest division in these types of
situations. How would you divide the total production value between you and the
other person?
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◦ Divide equally
◦ Divide proportional to individual production value
◦ Divide proportional to individual effort
Question 2
Is this the sort of situation in which people ought to play fair or is it socially acceptable
to use whatever bargaining power one has?
◦ Use bargaining power
◦ Play fair
Question 3
Rank from 1 (very important) to 4 (not so important) what you believe is important in
order to reach an agreement where you achieve your own goals in negotiations. Write
a number from 1 to 4 in all the boxes below. You cannot write the same number in
more than one box.
 You are willing to make concessions
 You have more bargaining power
 You seek a fair outcome
 You have a strong opening position
Questions for third parties only
1. What do you think explains why a person would let a third party decide the
outcome of a negotiation?
2. Which aspects of these negotiations would you emphasize as a third party? (refers
to four detailed examples on negotiations that are presented in writing)
3. Why would you emphasize these aspects?
4. How do you think the possibility of letting a third party decide the outcome of
a negotiation influences the proposals made by the parties during a negotiation?
5. Will the proposals that the parties have made during the negotiation influence
your judgement as a third party? If so, how?
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Appendix C Selected screenshots
This supplement contains a selection of the screenshots from the experiment. In the
heading of the screenshot there is a reference to the phase of the experiment explained in
Section 2 of the paper. This supplement contains screenshots from both treatments. The
screenshots are in Norwegian. The translation of the main text on the screen follows
below the screenshots. The translation is by the author.
 
Figure 5: Dictator game
Phase II - Distribution (situation 1 of 2)
You and another participant shall divide 600 kroner. You have been drawn to decide the distribution.
You have produced 300 words and are randomly assigned a price of 1.5 kroner per word. The value of your
production is 450 kroner. The other participant has produced 200 words and is randomly assigned a price of
0.75 kroner per word. The value of the other’s production is 150 kroner. The table below gives you an
overview of the situation.
production you the other
words produced 300 words 200 words
price per word 1.5 kr 0.75 kr
production value 450 kr 150 kr
How many kroner will you distribute to yourself and to the other?
Write into the box below the amount you will distribute to yourself and the other. Click on the button marked
with submit distribution.
You receive:  kroner. (The amount must be in whole kroner).
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Figure 6: Information about a bargaining situation
 
Phase III - Information (situation 2 of 4)
You and another participant in this room have been randomly matched. You shall agree about the division of
600 kr.
You have produced 200 words and are randomly assigned a price of 0.75 kr per word. The value of your
production is 150 kr. The other participant has produced 300 words and is randomly assigned a price of 1.5 kr
per word. The value of the other’s production is 450 kr. The table below gives you an overview of the situation.
production you the other
words produced 200 words 300 words
price per word 0.75 kr 1.5 kr
production value 150 kr 450 kr
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Figure 7: Beliefs about the outcome of the bargaining
 
Phase III - What do you think will be the finale division (situation 2
of 4)
Before you choose to send a proposal for division to the other, we ask you to answer what you think will be
your share the final division of 600 kroner in total production value in this situation.
You will receive 20 kroner extra if your answer is within plus or minus 20 kroner deviation from what the
actual division turns out to be. If this particular situation is drawn you will not receive both the earnings in
the situation and the extra earnings.
You receive:  kroner. (The amount must be in whole kroner).
Write down in per cent how sure you are that you will agree about this division.
I am  per cent sure that this will be the result.
production you the other
words produced 200 words 300 words
price per word 0.75 kr 1.5 kr
production value 150 kr 450 kr
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Figure 8: The first offer decision
 
Phase III - Proposal to division (situation 2 of 4)
You and another participant shall together agree on a division of 600 kr.
Every time one of you does not accept the others proposal, but suggests a different division, the total amount
to divide will be reduced by 4 per cent.
The table below shows how much you and the other have produced and which prices that you have been
randomly assigned.
production you the other
words produced 200 words 300 words
price per word 0.75 kr 1.5 kr
production value 150 kr 450 kr
How much do you propose that you receive?  kroner. (The amount must be in whole kroner).
52
Figure 9: The reoffer decision in the bargaining treatment
 
Phase III - Response division (situation 1 of 4)
The other proposes that you receive 231 kroner and that he or she receives 300 kroner of the total of 531
kroner to divide. What is your response to this proposal?
If you do not accept the other’s proposal, but make a different proposal, the total amount to divide will be
reduced by 4 per cent to 510 kroner in this round.
◦ I accept the proposal
◦ I propose a different division where I receive  kr.
The table below shows how much you and the other have produced and which prices that you have been
randomly assigned in this situation.
production you the other
words produced 300 words 200 words
price per word 1.5 kr 0.75 kr
production value 450 kr 150 kr
The table below shows what you and the other have proposed in each round.
round to divide you receive the other receives who made the proposal
1 600 600 0 your proposal
2 576 0 576 the other’s proposal
3 553 500 53 your proposal
4 531 231 300 the other’s proposal
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Figure 10: The reoffer decision in the third party treatment
 
Phase III - Response division (situation 1 of 4)
The other proposes that you receive 53 kroner and that he or she receives 500 kroner of the total of 553
kroner to divide. What is your response to this proposal?
If you do not accept the other’s proposal, but make a different proposal, the total amount to divide will be
reduced by 4 per cent to 531 kroner in this round.
If you choose to let a third party decide the division, the total amount that the third party shall divide will be
reduced by 10 per cent to 498 kroner.
◦ I accept the proposal
◦ I give a third party the task of deciding the division
◦ I propose a different division where I receive  kroner.
The table below shows how much you and the other have produced and which prices that you have been
randomly assigned in this situation.
production you the other
words produced 300 words 200 words
price per word 1.5 kr 0.75 kr
production value 450 kr 150 kr
The table below shows what you and the other have proposed in each round.
round to divide you receive the other receives who made the proposal
1 600 0 600 the other’s proposal
2 576 450 126 your proposal
3 553 53 500 the other’s proposal
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Figure 11: Beliefs about the third party decision
 
Phase III - What do you think the third party will do? (situation 4 of
4)
You have chosen to let a third party decide the division of 459 kr. Before that happens we ask you to answer
what you think will be the division that this third party chooses.
You will receive 20 kroner extra if your answer is within plus or minus 20 kroner deviation from what the
third party actually decide.
You receive:  kroner. (The amount must be in whole kroner).
Write down in per cent how sure you are that this is the division that the third party actually chooses.
I am  per cent sure that this will be the result.
The table below shows how much you and the other have produced and which prices that you have been
randomly assigned in this situation.
production you the other
words produced 300 words 200 words
price per word 1.5 kr 0.75 kr
production value 450 kr 150 kr
The table below shows what you and the other have proposed in each round.
round to divide you receive the other receives who made the proposal
1 600 300 300 the other’s proposal
2 576 450 126 your proposal
3 553 253 300 the other’s proposal
4 531 450 81 your proposal
5 510 210 300 the other’s proposal
6 Let third party decide your proposal
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Figure 12: The third party decision
 
Phase III - Information
Two other participants have not agreed on the division of a total production value.
The table below shows what participants 1 and 2 have produced and which prices they have randomly been
assigned.
Production Participant 1 Participant 2
Words produced 200 words 300 words
Price per word 0.75 kr 1.5 kr
Production value 150 kr 450 kr
The table below shows the amounts that each participant has proposed that he or she should receive in each
round.
Round To divide Participant 1 Participant 2 who made the proposal
1 600 600 0 Participant 1
2 576 126 450 Participant 2
3 553 500 53 Participant 1
4 Let third party decide Participant 2
Participant 2 did not accept the offer in round 3 and has decided that you shall decide the division of 498 kr
between the two participants in this situation.
The decision has reduced the amount that you shall divide with 10 per cent.
The amount you choose will not affect your own payment in the experiment.
How much do you decide that participant 1 receives?  kr.
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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a model that captures the potential conflict
between two individuals who follow different fairness principles in bargain-
ing. This model is used to analyse the influence of fairness motivation
on the possibility of reaching an agreement in bargaining, and to examine
the properties of the agreement. We show that bargaining between two
individuals who are strongly fairness motivated, but who disagree about
what represents a fair division, ends in disagreement. This result contrasts
the standard bargaining model with individuals who are only motivated by
material self-interest, which always leads to agreement. Furthermore, by
applying the Nash bargaining solution, we study the influence of fairness
motivation on the bargaining outcome. A fairness motivated individual
reaches an outcome that is closer to his fairness principle in bargaining
against an individual who is only motivated by material self-interest.
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1 Introduction
An equal division of monetary rewards is a frequent outcome in many labora-
tory experiments in bargaining, and it is a common principle in many real life
situations, for example, bequests to children (Camerer, 2003; Wilhelm, 1996).
In other situations, for example, in bargaining over the output from production,
experiments in economics and psychology have shown that many people follow
a principle of proportionality, although a minority still prefer the equal divi-
sion principle (Konow, 1996; Wagstaff, 2001; Ga¨chter and Riedl, 2005; Cappelen,
Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2010). Fairness principles such as equality and pro-
portionality may arise from moral or political philosophy or simply be accepted
over time as a way of dealing with distributive issues.
Hirschman (1977) and Elster (1989) have pointed to the fact that bargaining
between individuals who strongly believe in different fairness principles can easily
lead to conflict. They both argue that material self-interest can moderate conflicts
of fairness principles, in the words of Elster (1989):
The last case, norm conflict, is less likely to yield negotiated solu-
tions. In norm-free bargaining, the only thing at stake is self-interest,
a mild if mean-spirited passion. In norm conflict, the parties argue in
terms of their honour, a notoriously strong passion capable of inspir-
ing self-destructive and self-sacrificial behaviour. . . . Compromises are
possible between opposing norms, if one or both parties pour some
water in their wine and let self-interest override honour. (Elster, 1989,
p. 244).
In this paper, we develop a model that captures the potential conflict between
two individuals who follow different fairness principles in bargaining. An indi-
vidual’s preferences are represented by a utility function where he or she trades
off material self-interest and deviations from a fairness principle. The model is
a variation of the frequently used inequity aversion model, which assumes that
bargainers agree on a principle of equal division (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000; Bruyn and Bolton, 2008). The model in this paper builds
on Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2007), which allows individuals
to follow different fairness principles. This introduces a dimension of conflict be-
tween two bargainers who follow different fairness principles, in addition to the
trade-off between material self-interest and fairness motivation.1
1It is acknowledged in many models that different fairness principles should be considered,
but are left out for reasons of intractability. See, for example, Andreoni and Bernheim (2009)
who discuss fairness norms other than the 50–50 norm: ‘If the players are asymmetric with
respect to publicly observed inertia of merit, the fairness of an outcome might depend on the
extent to which it departs from some other benchmark, such as xF = 0.4. Provided the players
agree on xF , similar results would follow, except that the behavioural norm would correspond
to the alternate benchmark. However, if players have different views of xF , matters are more
complex’ (footnote 12).
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Fairness motivation can influence both the possibility of reaching an agree-
ment in bargaining and it can influence the properties of the agreement that is
reached. The first part of the paper studies how fairness motivation influences
the possibility of reaching an agreement. Proposition 2 formalizes the intuition
of Elster (1989), that bargaining between two individuals who strongly believe
in different fairness principles ends in conflict. This result shows the importance
of considering a plurality of fairness principles to understand many bargaining
problems. In contrast, Proposition 3 formalizes that if two bargainers follow the
same fairness principle, it is always possible to reach an agreement.
The second part of the paper analyses the properties of the agreements that
can be reached. We apply the Nash bargaining solution to bargaining situations
between different types of individuals. We find that bargaining between an in-
dividual with strong fairness motivation and an individual motivated only by
material self-interest, reaches an agreement that is closer to the fairness moti-
vated individual’s principle. If two bargainers who are motivated by fairness, but
who disagree about what represents a fair division, reach an agreement, it will
be a compromise between the two fair shares. We also show that in a bargain-
ing situation where both individuals follow a fairness principle of strict equality,
the Nash bargaining solution gives an equal division, and the trade-off between
material self-interest and fairness motivation does not influence the solution.
Empirical studies have found that people follow a plurality of fairness princi-
ples in negotiations, and that this can explain bargaining impasses and how these
are solved (Bazerman, 1985; Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, and Camerer,
1995; Babcock, Wang, and Loewenstein, 1996). Section 2 discusses data from a
bargaining experiment that shows that it is also important to include a plural-
ity of fairness principles to understand the properties of the agreements that are
reached in bargaining. The agreements are from a bargaining experiment where
participants have individually produced the endowment before they bargain over
a division of the endowment. The two most common models for bargaining
problems, material self-interest and preferences for equality, do not explain the
experimental data in Section 2.
The model is presented in Section 3. Bargaining is then analysed in two steps
in Section 4. First, the influence of fairness on the bargaining set is discussed
without relying on a specific solution concept, and second, the Nash bargaining
solution is applied to the problem. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Experiment
Data from a laboratory experiment illustrate the importance of including fair-
ness principles other than equality in bargaining.2 The experiment consists of a
2This experiment is discussed in more detail in (Birkeland, 2011).
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production phase and a bargaining phase. First, participants produce individ-
ually an output by typing a text from a transcript on the computer, and they
receive a monetary reward equal to each correct word typed, rounded off to the
nearest 50 words, multiplied by a randomly assigned high or low price. Second,
participants were randomly matched into pairs and instructed to bargain over
the endowment, which in this experiment is the sum of the individual produc-
tion values. The experiment used an alternating offer bargaining protocol with
infinite horizon.3
The 112 bargaining outcomes are shown in Figure 1, where the share of the
total production value to person one and to person two are on the axes. The
left panel shows the outcomes from 15 situations where both bargainers have
produced the same amount and have the same price, and the right panel shows
the outcomes from 97 situations where there is a difference in either the amount
produced or the price. All the points that are along the diagonal from the lower
left corner to the upper right corner are equal splits of the production value.
The results show that in all of the situations where bargainers have produced
the same amount (left panel), the bargaining outcome is an equal division (the
circle indicates the 10 observations that are equal divisions of the initial pro-
duction value).4 This result is consistent with the standard solution for players
motivated by material self-interest. Alternating offer bargaining between players
who are motivated by material self-interest, and have equal discount factors, gives
an almost equal split (Rubinstein, 1982).
In the right panel, 49% of the outcomes are equal divisions that give the
same amount of money to both participants. The number of equal divisions is
significantly reduced when there are differences between the players from the
production phase of the experiment (p < 0.001, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). These
observations are inconsistent with the prediction of the standard model where
bargainers are only motivated by material self-interest. We show later in the
paper that a model where bargainers are motivated by strict equality cannot
explain these observations either. A likely explanation for this shift to a more
unequal division of the production value is that bargainers are motivated by
fairness principles that do not imply equal division in these situations. A post-
experimental questionnaire confirmed this hypothesis: 96% of the participants
3The alternating offer protocol starts with one of the players being randomly assigned as the
first mover who suggests an opening offer in the first round (t = 1). Individual i proposes an
amount of pay-off xi for himself and Y −xi for the other player in each round of bargaining. The
second mover responds to the opening offer by either accepting it and the bargaining is closed
without cost, or by giving a counter offer in a second round (t = 2). The endowment shrinks
in each round t by a discount factor δti . An agreement is reached when one player accepts
the offer from the other player. In the experiment discussed in this paper, both players were
induced with an equal discount factor, δ = 0.96, which is so high that there is an insignificant
first-mover advantage.
4To accommodate rounding to the nearest NOK 5, all agreements within the 47.5–52.5 split
range are characterized as equal splits.
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Figure 1: Experimental bargaining results
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Note: The left panel shows outcomes from 15 situations where bargainers have the same pro-
duction value, and the right panel shows bargaining outcomes from 97 situations where there
are differences between bargainers in terms of either the amount produced or the price. The cir-
cle indicates the number of observations that are exactly a 50–50 split of the initial production
value.
supported principles that justify unequal division in these situations, whereas
only 4% of the participants supported equal division. Thus, the experiment
emphasizes the importance of allowing for fairness principles other than equal
division in economic models of bargaining to understand better many bargaining
problems.
3 Model
In this section, we describe the theoretical framework for the analysis, including
the bargaining environment and a utility function that can accommodate bargain-
ers who are motivated by different fairness principles. We consider a bargaining
environment in which two players bargain over how to divide an endowment, Y .
Players can agree on any pair x = (x1, x2) of shares of the endowment, xi ∈ [0, 1],
such that the pair of shares is in the set X = {x | x1 + x2 ≤ 1}, which is called
the set of feasible agreements. In the following, we assume complete information,
that is, the rules of the game and the utility functions of both players are common
knowledge.
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3.1 Fairness principle
An individual is assumed to have preferences that can be represented by a utility
function where deviation from a fair share of the endowment reduces utility. The
fair share of the endowment to individual i, according to his fairness principle
k, is denoted as sk(i) ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that the fairness principle gives a
unique division of the endowment, which is the case for all the fairness principles
discussed in this paper.5
Assumption 1. For any endowment, Y , and fairness principle, k, there exists
a unique fair division (sk(1), sk(2)), such that sk(1) + sk(2) = 1.
The following example illustrates how principles of fairness could be applied
in a production context. Consider a case where the endowment, Y , is the sum
of individual production values, yi, which can be decomposed into the individual
production of units, ei, and price, pi, such that yi = eipi. In a two-person case,
let e1 = 3, e2 = 1, p1 =
1
3
, and p2 = 3, then the production values are y1 = 1
and y2 = 3, and the endowment Y = 4. This could, for example, be bargaining
between two executives about their share of a bonus in a corporation where one
business area is exposed to the oil price and another business area is exposed to the
aluminium price. In this context, there are three different distributive principles
that are salient, k = E,L, P . The first fairness principle is an equal sharing
of the monetary rewards, strict equality, which implies a fair share sE(i) = 1
2
.
The second fairness principle is a laissez-faire principle, where the individual
production values determine the fair share to individual i, sL(i) = eipi
Y
. The third
principle is proportionality, where the fair share to individual i is proportional
to the level of the production of units, sP (i) = ei
e1+e2
, but where prices have no
influence on the division.
In our example, implementation of these three fairness principles for two in-
dividuals gives the nine combinations of fair shares in Table 1. Each entry in
the table shows the fair share that person one and person two claim according to
their fairness principle, if that is only what they care about. The combinations
of fairness principles can be divided into three categories: (i) both players follow
the same fairness principle (diagonal elements), where by Assumption 1 the fair
shares are always compatible; (ii) players one and two follow different fairness
principles such that fair shares are incompatible, sk(1) +sk(2) > 1; (iii) players one
and two follow different fairness principles such that fair shares sum to less than
one, sk(1) + sk(2) < 1. Category (ii) is a natural bargaining situation where there
5The relevant set of fairness principles must be specified for the context in the model is ap-
plied. Which fairness principle an individual follows in a particular context, may depend on his
identity; for example, an individual may follow a different fairness principle if he is an employer
or if he is an employee (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). The formulation of a fairness principle as
a fair share of the endowment excludes some possible fairness principles, for example, principles
that are related to the size of the endowment.
62
Table 1: Combinations of fairness principles
sE(2) sL(2) sP (2)
sE(1) (1
2
, 1
2
) (1
2
, 3
4
) (1
2
, 1
4
)
sL(1) (1
4
, 1
2
) (1
4
, 3
4
) (1
4
, 1
4
)
sP (1) (3
4
, 1
2
) (3
4
, 3
4
) (3
4
, 1
4
)
Note: The table shows combinations of the fairness principles E,L, P for person one and person
two for parameters e1 = 3, e2 = 1, p1 = 13 , p2 = 3. Each entry shows the fair shares that person
one and person two claim according to their principles if they only care about fairness.
is conflict of interest. Category (iii) is less important in bargaining and will not
be discussed in the following analysis.
In this numerical example, different fairness principles give different fair shares,
but this is not necessarily the case in all situations. Different principles can also
give the same fair shares in some situations; for example, an equal division fol-
lows both from the fairness principle of strict equality, and from the principle of
proportionality if both individuals have produced the same number of units.
3.2 Utility function
We assume that the utility function is additively separable for individual i in his
own share of the endowment, xi, and the cost of deviating from the fair share,
xi − sk(i). The endowment is assumed to be non-negative, Y ≥ 0.
Assumption 2. Individual i’s preferences can be represented by the utility func-
tion:
ui(xiY, s
k(i)Y ) = (xi − βi(xi − sk(i))2)Y.
The utility loss from deviating from the fair share is squared, which implies
that the utility loss from deviation to the better or the worse is symmetric,
and that the utility loss increases exponentially with the distance. The weight
individual i has on not deviating from his fair share is given by the parameter
βi, which is assumed to be non-negative, βi ≥ 0. If βi = 0, the model is reduced
to material self-interest, a utility function that is linear in xi. The parameter βi
captures tension between an individual’s motivation to follow a fairness principle
and that of material self-interest.6 This utility function is continuous, twice
6The functional form of the utility function follows the two-person case of Bolton and Ock-
enfels (2000), Lopomo and Ok (2001), Cappelen et al. (2007), and Bruyn and Bolton (2008).
The parameter βi captures the trade-off that is represented by the fraction bi2ai in Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000). The utility function in this paper differs from Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
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differentiable and concave in xi. The utility function attains its inner maximum
when:
x∗i =
1
2βi
+ sk(i).
The interior solution to an individual, x∗i , is not defined for βi = 0, and it is
independent of the endowment Y . The utility function is strictly increasing in
the interval 0 ≤ xi ≤ sk(i). Only for small values of βi, that is, βi < 12(1−sk(i)) ,
is the utility function strictly increasing in the entire interval 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1. For
high values of βi, the importance of obtaining the fair share outweighs the utility
of obtaining a larger share of the endowment, see also Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000). In the case that βi →∞, the interior solution approaches the fair share,
x∗i → sk(i).
This model allows for different types of players: a material self-interested
player, a strongly fairness motivated player, as well as an intermediate type that
trades off material self-interest and fairness motivation. It also introduces differ-
ences regarding which fairness principle players follow.
The effects of changing the parameters of the weights assigned to fairness, βi,
and the fair share, sk(i), are illustrated in Figure 2. We observe that all three
utility functions illustrated in the figure attain negative values for a small x, but
only the utility function with a high βi attains negative values for a large x.
Shifting the fair share, sk(i), to a higher value raises the point where the utility
function is zero. We also observe that the utility function with a high βi envelops
the utility function with the same fair share, sk(i), but a lower βi, because an
increase in fairness motivation reduces the utility from deviating from the fair
share.
In bargaining, people evaluate their utility from possible agreements against
the utility from the situation where no agreement is reached. We assume that
the disagreement utility is zero.
Assumption 3. Individual i’s utility from disagreement is zero, udi = 0.
Assumption 3 follows directly from the specification of the utility function in
an economic environment where the endowment is zero in disagreement, Y = 0,
which is the case in many bargaining experiments. This assumption implies,
in that it allows for fair shares other than sk(i) = 12 . In the model of Lopomo and Ok (2001), a
bargainer’s utility depends on both his absolute gain and the relative share he gets compared
with the average share. The model of Lopomo and Ok (2001) allows for uncertainty about
the weight that the other players have on the deviation from the average share. The utility
function in Cappelen et al. (2007) allows for different fairness principles, but the principles are
not defined in shares of the endowment. The utility function used in Bruyn and Bolton (2008)
is linear above an equal division. If you introduce players with different fairness principles in
a model with asymmetries in valuing deviations from a fair share, e.g., the Bruyn and Bolton
(2008) model, this could easily result in a non-convex Pareto frontier of the bargaining set,
which could give multiple Nash bargaining solutions.
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Figure 2: The utility function
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Note: The utility function given in Assumption 2 for different parameter values, Y = 1.
however, that an individual’s fairness consideration does not apply to the dis-
agreement outcome.
3.3 Reservation points
An individual’s reservation point is defined as the share that makes an individual
indifferent between accepting an offer or choosing disagreement, which gives zero
utility. As illustrated in Figure 2, the present model allows for more than one
reservation point. The lower reservation point, xLi in the interval 0 ≤ xLi ≤ sk(i),
where ui(xiY, s
k(i)Y ) = 0 is given by:
xLi =
1 + 2βis
k(i) −
√
1 + 4βisk(i)
2βi
.
The reservation point is influenced both by the fairness principle and the weight
that an individual attaches to following the fairness principle. For a fairness mo-
tivated individual, βi > 0, an offer below the lower reservation point would be
considered too unfair, and it is therefore rejected, although the offer represents
a positive share of the endowment. In contrast, the utility function for an in-
dividual who is only motivated by material self-interest, βi = 0, always has a
lower reservation point at zero, and he would not reject a positive share of the
endowment.
An important property of the lower reservation point is that when βi increases
the reservation point, xLi , approaches the fair share:
lim
βi→∞
xLi = s
k(i).
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We focus on the lower reservation because it is used later in the paper to analyse
the bargaining set. For large values of βi, there is also an upper reservation point,
xHi , in the interval s
k(i) ≤ xHi ≤ 1. The upper reservation point will correspond
to situations where a player, for example, is offered the whole gain, and he rejects
this as unfair even though it benefits him.
Proposition 1. Reservation points. For any fair share sk(i), there is a value βˆi
such that for any 0 < βi < βˆi there exists a unique reservation point, x
L
i , and for
any βi ≥ βˆi there exist two reservation points, xLi , and xHi .
Proof. See Appendix A.
4 Bargaining solutions
In this section, we use cooperative bargaining theory to analyse the outcome
from bilateral bargaining with fairness motivated individuals. A cooperative bar-
gaining solution is not based on a specific bargaining process. It is assumed
that an agreement from bargaining is binding and enforceable through a legal
system outside of the model. Cooperative bargaining theory builds on a utility
representation of the feasible agreements, which is the convex utility set:7
U = {(u1(x1Y, sk(1)Y ), u2(x2Y, sk(2)Y )) : x ∈ X} .
First, following standard analysis we require that the agreement is at the fron-
tier of the utility set, which implies that the agreement is in the set Z =
{x | x1 + x2 = 1}.8 Second, we require that the agreement gives both players
at least as much utility as they can get without an agreement, which from As-
sumption 3 implies that the agreement must give both players at least zero utility.
These two requirements ensure that the agreement is in the bargaining set, B.9
Assumption 4. An agreement is in the bargaining set:
B(U) = {(u1(x1Y, sk(1)Y ), u2(x2Y, sk(2)Y )) ≥ (0, 0) : x ∈ Z} .
Bargaining sets for two individuals are illustrated in Figure 3, where the left
panel shows individuals who disagree on what is a fair division, and the right
panel shows individuals who agree on what is a fair division. Each line represents
a bargaining set for different parameter values for person one and person two. The
two end-points of a bargaining set are defined where person one gets maximum
utility given that person two gets enough utility to accept the agreement, which
must be at his lower reservation point, (umax1 , u2(x
L
2 ) = 0), and similarly where
person two gets maximum utility given that person one gets enough utility to
accept the agreement (u1(x
L
1 ) = 0, u
max
2 ).
7Two strictly increasing concave functions give a convex combination (Binmore, 2007).
8Roth (1979) discusses the standard assumptions of cooperative bargaining theory.
9Here, ≥ is defined coordinatewise, that is, (x1, x2) ≥ (y1, y2) iff xi ≥ yi for each i = 1, 2.
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Figure 3: Bargaining sets
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Note: The left panel shows bargaining sets where players have incompatible fair shares, and the
right panel shows bargaining sets where they agree on fair shares. The lines represent different
levels of (β1, β2). The endowment Y = 1. Points marked x and y are the end-points of the
Pareto frontier for the dotted line.
We observe that the bargaining set for fairness motivated individuals is typ-
ically smaller than the bargaining set for players who are more motivated by
material self-interest. The bargaining set shrinks when βi increases because an
individual gets disutility from deviating from the fair share, and he consequently
increases his reservation point. A smaller bargaining set means that there are
fewer possible agreements that can be realized. It is often argued that the fre-
quency of disagreements in bargaining is higher when there are fewer possible
agreements that can be realized. The relationship between the size of the bar-
gaining set and the efficiency of bargaining is, however, unclear. Crawford (1982),
for example, develops a bargaining model where disagreements are reduced when
the size of the bargaining set shrinks.
The left panel in Figure 3 represents bargaining sets where players have in-
compatible fair shares. In this case, the bargaining set moves towards the origin
for bargainers who are more fairness motivated, and at some point, the bargain-
ing set is empty, which occurs when reservation points are incompatible, i.e., the
reservation points combined constitute more than the endowment. Consequently,
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players prefer to disagree. This shows that strong preferences for conflicting fair-
ness principles make it impossible to reach an agreement.
Proposition 2. Principled disagreement. If the fair shares are incompatible,
sk(1) + sk(2) > 1, then there exists a (βˆ1, βˆ2) such that for any (β1 ≥ βˆ1, β2 ≥ βˆ2),
the only feasible solution is the disagreement outcome.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The right panel in Figure 3 represents bargaining sets where both players
follow the same fairness principle. We observe from Figure 3 that for players who
are more fairness motivated, the bargaining set shrinks and envelopes the point
that both players consider a fair division. The bargaining set shrinks further for
players who are strongly motivated by the fairness principle, and in the limit, the
bargaining set only contains the fair solution. Proposition 3 formalizes the point
that, for bargainers who follow the same fairness principle, it is always possible
to reach an agreement.
Proposition 3. Principled agreement. If two individuals follow the same fairness
principle, k, then there always exists a non-empty bargaining set, B. Increases in
β1 and β2 give a shrinking bargaining set, and in the limit, it collapses to a single
point, which represents the fair division (sk(1), sk(2)).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The reservation point of a player can drop below the other player’s utility
maximizing offer, and still give the first player more utility than in disagreement.
This occurs when the two bargainers agree on the fairness principle, and at least
one of them is strongly fairness motivated. The bargaining set marked with a
dotted line in the right panel in Figure 3 has two points marked x and y. The
line connecting these two points is the Pareto frontier.10 A high βi changes the
curvature of the frontier of the bargaining set such that the line segment up to
the point marked x represents a Pareto improvement for player one, and the line
segment up to the point marked y represents a Pareto improvement for player two.
Pareto optimality is a requirement for the Nash bargaining solution discussed in
the next section.
10The point marked x in Figure 3 is defined as the maximum utility that player two can
achieve, given that no further Pareto improvement for player one is possible, (u˜1, umax2 ) where
u˜1 > u1(xL) = 0, and the point marked y is the maximum utility that player one can achieve,
given that no further Pareto improvement for player two is possible, (umax1 , u˜2), where u˜2 >
u2(xL) = 0.
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4.1 Nash bargaining solution
A commonly used concept for finding a unique outcome in the bargaining set is
the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950).11 The Nash bargaining solution is
the maximum of the product of the utility minus the utility of disagreement, udi :
max(u1 − ud1)(u2 − ud2).
The analytical solution to the Nash bargaining solution for the model developed
in this paper is derived in Appendix B. The non-linearity of the utility function
makes the analytical solution difficult to interpret, but the effect of changing the
parameters can easily be interpreted by studying numerical computations.
Figure 4 shows the Nash bargaining solution for different combinations of
players. Each point on the four panels shows the share that player one receives,
x1, at different levels of the fairness weight, β1.
12 The four panels show matching
of player one against different types of player two. The standard solution for
two players only motivated by material self-interest is an equal division of the
monetary gain, which is the starting point in the upper left panel. This panel
shows that if player one has a higher weight on following his fairness principle,
the bargaining solution gives a share that is closer to his fair share, which in this
example is sk(1) = 3
4
. A fairness motivated player who takes a principled stand
in bargaining will achieve a solution that is closer to his fairness principle if he
bargains against a player who is only motivated by material self-interest.
In the upper right panel both players are fairness motivated, and they agree
on the fair division (sk(1) = 3
4
, sk(2) = 1
4
). We observe that all the bargaining
solutions are close to the fair division. An increase in the trade-off between self-
interest and fairness motivation, β1, has an insignificant effect on the bargaining
solution. In line with Proposition 2, sufficiently high weights on following the
same fairness principle give the fair division.
In the lower left panel, player two is also a fairness motivated player, but in this
example player two disagrees with player one about the fairness principle. Both
players believe that it would be fair if they get three-quarters of the endowment;
thus, they both have the same fair share (sk(1) = 3
4
, sk(2) = 3
4
). From the lower left
panel, we see that at low levels of β1, the bargaining solution is a division that is
close to player two’s fair share. At high levels of β1, the bargaining solution is a
compromise solution between the fair shares, which in this example is an equal
11Nash (1950) proves that this is the only solution that fulfils four reasonable axioms: (i)
the solution should be independent of affine transformations of the utility function; (ii) the
solution should be independent of irrelevant alternatives; (iii) the solution should treat players
symmetrically; and (iv) the solution should be Pareto optimal. An introduction to bargaining
theory and the Nash axioms is found in Roth (1979) and Binmore (2007).
12Bruyn and Bolton (2008) and Cappelen et al. (2007) estimate the average weight that an
individual has on following his fairness principle. The average weight, converted to a value
comparable to βi, is 6.0 for a three-round bargaining game in Bruyn and Bolton (2008), and
7.7 for a dictator game in Cappelen et al. (2007).
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Figure 4: Nash bargaining solution
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Note: The graph shows the Nash bargaining solution for the share that player one receives,
x1, for different levels of the fairness weight, β1. Player one has a fairness principle sk(1) = 34
in the first three panels, and sk(1) = 12 in the lower right panel. The parameters for player
two are: ‘Fairness vs. self-interest’: β2 = 0; ‘Fairness agreement’: β2 = 7, sk(2) = 14 ; ‘Fairness
disagreement’: β2 = 7, sk(2) = 34 ; ‘Equality’: β2 = 7, s
k(2) = 12 . The endowment Y = 1.
division. Importantly, in line with Proposition 3, two players who disagree about
what is a fair share cannot reach an agreement if their fairness motivation is too
strong. At the level of β1 = 10 in the lower left panel, the bargain solution is the
disagreement outcome of zero.
The lower right panel shows the case where both players are fairness motivated
and both players agree on a principle of strict equality. We can see that, in this
case, the trade-off between self-interest and fairness motivation, β1, does not
influence the solution. This last result follows from the property of symmetric
treatment of players in the Nash bargaining solution.
Proposition 4. Fairness weight impotency. If bargainers follow the fairness
principle of strict equality, sk(1) = sk(2) = 1
2
, then the Nash bargaining solution is
(xN1 =
1
2
, xN2 =
1
2
) for any β1, β2.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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4.2 The generalized Nash bargaining solution
There is a version of the Nash bargaining solution that allows for bargaining
power, αi, to influence the solution:
max(u1 − ud1)α1(u2 − ud2)α2 .
In the standard case where individuals are only motivated by material self-
interest, the individual with more bargaining power gets a larger share of the
endowment than a player with less bargaining power. Similarly, in bargaining be-
tween two equally fairness motivated individuals who disagree about fair shares,
the individual with more bargaining power gets closer to his fair share. This ar-
gument also works the other way, a more fairness motivated individual gets closer
to his fair share for a given distribution of bargaining power. Fairness motivation
can therefore counterbalance the influence of unfavourable bargaining power.
Moreover, the same outcome that follows from bargaining between two equally
strong fairness motivated individuals who agree on the fairness principle, may also
be the result of bargaining between self-interested individuals who have bargain-
ing power distributed in the same proportion as the fair shares. An interpretation
of this result is that there are two ways to achieve a fair outcome in bargaining,
through agreement about fairness principles or regulation of bargaining power.
However, in one case where the relative bargaining power is distributed in
the exact same proportion as the fair shares that follow from a fairness principle,
fairness motivation does not influence the generalized Nash bargaining solution.
This result is similar to Proposition 4 where individuals are motivated by the fair-
ness principle of strict equality and they have equal bargaining power. Numerical
computation gives support to the following conjecture (see Appendix A).
Conjecture 1. Generalized fairness weight impotency. If sk(1) + sk(2) = 1, α1 =
sk(1) and α2 = s
k(2), then the generalized Nash bargaining solution is (xN1 =
sk(1), xN2 = s
k(2)), for any β1, β2.
5 Concluding remarks
Individuals who are only motivated by material self-interest are always able to
make a compromise and find an agreement, provided that the monetary reward
from agreement is higher than from the disagreement outcome. For fairness
motivated individuals, the outcome from bargaining will depend both on the
principle they follow, and the trade-off they make between following the principle
and material self-interest. First, people who are motivated by the same fairness
principle have a non-empty bargaining set and it is always possible to reach an
agreement, and if they have a high weight on following the principle, they will
agree on the fair outcome. Second, if people disagree about what is a fair share,
it may be impossible to reach an agreement, particularly if they have a high
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weight on following their principles. Disagreement can easily be the outcome
from bargaining between players that insist on different fairness principles.
The Nash bargaining solution shows that bargaining between an individual
with strong fairness motivation and an individual only motivated by material self-
interest reaches an outcome that is closer to the fairness motivated individual’s
principle. In bargaining between two individuals motivated by fairness, and who
disagree about what represents a fair division, the Nash bargaining solution gives
an outcome that is a compromise between the fair shares. If individuals follow
the commonly assumed fairness principle of strict equality, the trade-off between
following the fairness principle and material self-interest does not influence the
outcome. The generalized Nash bargaining solution shows that a strongly fair-
ness motivated individual can balance the higher bargaining power of another
individual.
This research could be extended both theoretically and empirically. An inter-
esting theoretical extension is to incorporate characteristics of the disagreement
outcome into individuals’ fairness principles. Another important issue for further
research is how social preference models influence the efficiency of bargaining.
Finally, I would like to point to several empirical hypotheses for fairness mo-
tivation that can be derived from the analysis in this paper. First, material
self-interest may be more predominant in societies where there is a great deal of
plurality of fairness principles among people, and conversely, in a more homoge-
neous society, people may be more fairness motivated. In societies with a great
deal of heterogeneity, it is important to reach compromises in transactions. Thus,
an environment that fosters material self-interest may perform better than one
that fosters fairness motivation. Second, the analysis in this paper shows that
fairness motivation could develop among groups in societies where the bargain-
ing power is to their disadvantage. The mobilization of fairness motivation can
neutralize the imbalance of bargaining power. The development of strong fair-
ness principles among unions in wage negotiations could be an example of this.
Third, in societies with strong groups that are motivated by different fairness
principles, the analysis shows that there can be more conflicts, for example, in
societies where employers and employees strongly believe in different principles
of wage setting.
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Appendix A Proof of propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
We want to show that for any fair share, sk(i), there is a value βˆi such that for any
0 < βi < βˆi there exists a unique reservation point, x
L
i , and for any βi ≥ βˆi there
exist two reservation points, xLi , and x
H
i . The utility function in Assumption 1:
ui(xiY, s
k(i)Y ) = (xi − βi(xi − sk(i))2)Y,
is a quadratic equation:
a1x
2 + a2x+ a3 = 0,
where the coefficients are reduced to:
a1 = −βi,
a2 = (1 + 2βis
k(i)),
a3 = −βi(sk(i))2.
The discriminant, a22−4a1a3 = 1 + 4βisk(i), is positive and hence the utility func-
tion has two real, distinct roots. The quadratic formula gives the two solutions:
xLi =
1 + 2βis
k(i) −
√
1 + 4βisk(i)
2βi
, xHi =
1 + 2βis
k(i) +
√
1 + 4βisk(i)
2βi
.
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These solutions are not defined for βi = 0. By definition, a fair share, s
k(i), can
have values in the interval 0 ≤ sk(i) ≤ 1. We see that if sk(i) = 0, then xLi = 0.
Differentiate xLi with respect to βi:
dxLi
dβi
=
1 + 2βis
k(i) −
√
1 + 4βisk(i)
2β2i
√
1 + 4βisk(i)
.
For the numerator to be positive, 1 + 2βis
k(i) >
√
1 + 4βisk(i). By squaring both
sides of the inequality we see that the numerator is always positive for sk(i) > 0.
Hence,
dxLi
dβi
> 0, and xLi is strictly increasing in βi for s
k(i) > 0. We know from
Section 3.3 that limβi→∞ x
L
i = s
k(i). Thus, there always exists a lower reservation
point, xLi , which attains values in the interval 0 ≤ xLi ≤ sk(i).
We then consider the upper reservation point, xHi . We can see that if s
k(i) = 1,
then xHi > 1, which is outside of the domain of the utility function for argument
xi. Differentiate x
H
i with respect to βi:
dxHi
dβi
=
−1− 2βisk(i) −
√
1 + 4βisk(i)
2β2i
√
1 + 4βisk(i)
.
We see that xHi is strictly decreasing in βi, since
dxHi
dβi
< 0. If sk(i) < 1, then
xHi may attain values in the interval 0 < x
H
i ≤ 1, depending on the relationship
between sk(i) and βi. Define βˆi such that x
H = 1, which gives:
βˆi =
1
(1− sk(i))2 .
Any βi ≥ βˆi will give an upper reservation point in the interval 0 < xHi ≤ 1.
Hence, for βi in the interval 0 < βi < βˆi, there exists a unique reservation point,
xLi , and for βi ≥ βˆi there exist two reservation points, xLi , and xHi .
Proof of Proposition 2
We want to show that if the fair shares are incompatible, sk(1) + sk(2) > 1, then
there exists a (βˆ1, βˆ2) such that for any (β1 ≥ βˆ1, β2 ≥ βˆ2), the only feasible
solution is the disagreement outcome. Note that by assumption, if sk(1)+sk(2) > 1,
then sk(1) > 0 and sk(2) > 0.
1. From Section 4 we know that B is empty if xL1 + xL2 > 1.
2. From Proposition 1 we know that there exists a lower reservation point, xLi ,
which is strictly increasing in βi for s
k(i) > 0.
3. Define ε < |1−sk(1)−sk(2)
2
|. Find (βˆ1, βˆ2) such that xL1 = sk(1) − ε and xL2 =
sk(2) − ε.
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4. It follows from step 2 and step 3 that xL1 +x
L
2 > 1 for any (β1 ≥ βˆ1, β2 ≥ βˆ2).
Hence, from step 1 it then follows that B is empty, and the only feasible
solution is the disagreement outcome.
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider any combination of (β1, β2). We want to show that B(β1, β2) is non-
empty, i.e. xL1 +x
L
2 ≤ 1, if two individuals who follow the same fairness principle,
k.
1. From Assumption 1 we know that if two individuals follow the same fairness
principle, k, then sk(1) + sk(2) = 1.
2. From Proposition 1 we know that there exists a lower reservation point, xLi ,
which is monotonically increasing in βi in the interval 0 ≤ xLi ≤ sk(i). For
a given (β1, β2), we find (x
L
1 , x
L
2 ) by using the formula in Proposition 1.
3. By taking into account step 1, it follows from step 2 that xL1 + x
L
2 ≤ 1, and
hence B(β1, β2) is non-empty. This completes the proof of the first part of
Proposition 3.
4. We also want to show that an increase in β1 and β2 in the limit collapses to a
single point, which represents the fair division (sk(1), sk(2)). If (β1, β2)→∞,
it follows from Proposition 1 that (xL1 , x
L
2 )→ (sk(1), sk(2)). By Assumption
1, (sk(1), sk(2)) is a unique element. Hence, in the limit B only contains one
element, which is the utility representation of (sk(1), sk(2)). This completes
the proof of the second part of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider any combination of β1 ≥ 0 and β2 ≥ 0. We want to show that if
bargainers follow the fairness principle of strict equality, then the Nash bargaining
solution is (xN1 =
1
2
, xN2 =
1
2
).
1. Consider the case where β1 = β2 = 0. The model is then reduced to a
standard utility function, and it follows straightforwardly that the solution
is (xN1 =
1
2
, xN2 =
1
2
).
2. Consider the case where β1 > 0 and β2 > 0. By assumption, the parameter
values are sk(1) = sk(2) = 1
2
in the Nash bargaining solution.
3. Differentiate the Nash bargaining solution (as stated in Appendix B) with
respect to β1 and β2. If you evaluate these two expressions for any β1 and
β2, the outcome is zero. Hence, changes in β1 and β2 do not influence the
Nash bargaining solution.
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Examples of Conjecture 1
Table 2: Asymmetric bargaining power
β2
1 5 10
1 (0.75, 0.25) (0.75, 0.25) (0.75, 0.25)
β1 5 (0.75, 0.25) (0.75, 0.25) (0.75, 0.25)
10 (0.75, 0.25) (0.75, 0.25) (0.75, 0.25)
Note: Table 2 shows a numerical computation of the generalized Nash bargaining solution for
person one and person two for parameters α1 = sk(1) = 0.75, and α2 = sk(2) = 0.25.
Table 3: Symmetric bargaining power
β2
1 5 10
1 (0.5, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5)
β1 5 (0.5, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5)
10 (0.5, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5)
Note: Table 3 shows a numerical computation of the generalized Nash bargaining solution for
person one and person two for parameters α1 = sk(1) = 0.5, and α2 = sk(2) = 0.5.
Appendix B Analytical solution
The Nash bargaining solution can be found by solving the optimization problem:
max (u1 − ud1)(u2 − ud2)
s.t. x1 + x2 = 1.
From Section 3.2 we have:
ui(xiY, s
k(i)Y ) = (xi − βi(xi − sk(i))2)Y,
udi = 0.
By substituting the constraint into the objective function, the optimization prob-
lem can be written as:
max f(x1) =
(
(x1 − β1(x1 − s1)2)Y
)(
(1− x1 − β2(1− x1 − s2)2)Y
)
.
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Differentiating f with respect to x1 gives a cubic equation (the subscript on x is
suppressed):
a1x
3 + a2x
2 + a3x+ a4 = 0,
where the coefficients are:
a1 = 4β1β2Y
2,
a2 = (3β1 − 3β2 − 6β1β2 − 6s1β1β2 + 6s2β1β2)Y 2,
a3 = (−2− 2β1 − 4s1β1 + 4β2 − 4s2β2 + 2β1β2 + 8s1β1β2 + 2s21β1β2
− 4s2β1β2 − 8s1s2β1β2 + 2s22β1β2)Y 2,
a4 = (1 + 2s1β1 + s
2
1β1 − β2 + 2s2β2 − s22β2 − 2s1β1β2 − 2s21β1β2
+ 4s1s2β1β2 + 2s
2
1s2β1β2 − 2s1s22β1β2)Y 2.
Define the following relationships:
Q ≡ a3
3a1
−
(
a2
3a1
)2
,
R ≡ a3a2
6a21
− a4
2a1
−
(
a2
3a1
)3
,
D ≡ Q3 +R2,
S ≡
(
R +
√
D
) 1
3
,
T ≡
(
R−
√
D
) 1
3
.
D is the discriminant that determines the nature of the roots of the equation. If
D > 0, there is one real root and two conjugate complex roots; if D = 0, there
are real roots of which at least two are equal; if D < 0, there are three distinct
real roots. In this model, D is negative and there are three distinct real roots.
Cardano’s formulae for the roots are as follows:
root1 = − a2
3a1
+ (S + T ),
root2 = − a2
3a1
− 1
2
(S + T ) +
1
2
i
√
3(S − T ),
root3 = − a2
3a1
− 1
2
(S + T )− 1
2
i
√
3(S − T ),
where i =
√−1. It turns out for this model that root2 < root3 < root1. The
optimal solution is xN1 = root3, and the Nash bargaining solution is (x
N
1 , 1−xN1 ).
The solution is only defined for β1 > 0 and β2 > 0. To make sure the solution is
in the bargaining set B(U), check that (u1(xN1 ), u2(1− xN1 )) > (0, 0).
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Abstract
Criminal activity has significant costs for society and considerable re-
sources are used on crime prevention. Economists have traditionally fo-
cused on how economic opportunities affect criminal behavior and have
largely ignored the potential role of social preferences. This paper studies
the social preferences of criminals and it is, to our knowledge, the first to
do so by conducting an economic lab experiment on a group of prisoners.
The main finding in our study is that the prisoners are not immoral in
the sense that they are generally unwilling to act on pro-social preferences.
Comparing the behavior of the prisoners with the behavior of a benchmark
group recruited from a representative sample of the Norwegian population,
we find a striking similarity in the importance the two groups attach to
pro-social preferences both in strategic and non-strategic situations. We
furthermore find little evidence of in-group favoritism in situations where
the two groups interact. The pro-social behavior of the prisoners in our
experiment clearly contrasts with their anti-social behavior outside the lab.
One possible explanation for this cross-situational inconsistency is that be-
havior in the lab is motivated by different social preferences than behavior
outside the lab. The situational inconsistency in behavior could, however,
also be seen as suggesting that social preferences are of little importance,
compared to circumstances, in explaining criminal behavior.
∗We would like to thank James Konow and Karl Ove Moene for valuable comments and
suggestions. We would also like to thank Harald Aasaune at Bjørgvin Prison and Leif Waage
at the The Norwegian Correctional Services for their cooperation, Magne Ludvigsen, Bjørn
Ivar Grøtt˚a, Morten Sæthre, and Kristian Øpstad for IT-support, and Henrik Birkeland, Øys-
tein Dvergsdal, Trygve Eiken, Lars Engebretsen, Hans Petter Gramer, Cathrine Gravdal, Ole-
Aleksander Greve, Line Halvorsen, Trond Halvorsen, Liv Eline Hetland, Jon Rasmussen, Karo-
line Salamonsen, Jonas Tungodden, and Fredrik Young-Halvorsen for research assistance. The
project was financed by support from the Research Council of Norway, research grant 185831,
and the Center for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo.
79
1 Introduction
Criminal activity has significant direct costs for society and considerable resources
are used on crime prevention. Close to ten million individuals are held in penal
institutions around the world (Walmsley, 2009) and in the US alone, 227 billion
USD are spent each year to catch, prosecute, and punish offenders (Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 2010). It is therefore important to understand what explains
criminal behavior.
According to standard economic theory of crime, a person commits a crime if
the expected consequences of doing so are better than the expected consequences
of any legal alternative. Economists have focused on how differences in legal
income opportunities and differences in the expected cost of punishment might
explain differences in criminal behavior (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Becker,
1968; Dilulio, 1996; Eide, 2000; Levitt, 1997, 2004; Lochner, 2004; McCarthy,
2002). The economic theory of crime has typically ignored how moral considera-
tions might affect the decision to commit a crime, but such considerations could
easily be included in the theory as a moral cost of crime (Andvig and Moene,
1990).
Recent experimental studies have documented that many people are moti-
vated by social preferences and often take moral costs into account when they
make decisions that have consequences for others (Camerer, 2003). These studies
have also shown that there is considerable heterogeneity in pro-social prefer-
ences both within and across groups (Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr,
and Gintis, 2004). Heterogeneity in pro-social preferences could potentially be
important in explaining criminal behavior because crime typically has negative
consequences for others (Wikstro¨m, 2006; Wikstro¨m and Treiber, 2007). More
specifically, if people take into account how their actions affect others before
they decide whether or not to commit a crime, then the likelihood of a person
committing a crime would be decreasing in the importance he attaches to pro-
social preferences. Consequently we would expect criminals on average to be less
motivated by pro-social preferences than non-criminals.
This paper reports the results from, to our knowledge, the first economic ex-
periment designed to study the social preferences of criminals. The experiment
consists of a dictator game and two versions of the trust game: a standard trust
game and a trust game with punishment. The dictator game provides us with the
classical measure of the importance attached to pro-social preferences in a non-
strategic situation. However, as pointed out by Fehr, Naef, and Schmidt (2006),
social preferences may differ fundamentally across economic environments, in par-
ticular between strategic and non-strategic situations. The trust games allow us
to study social preferences in strategic situations (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe,
1995).
The prisoners taking part in the experiment were recruited from a medium
security prison in Norway. The majority of the prisoners had committed crimes
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related to drugs, violence, or fraud. In order to have a benchmark with which to
compare the behavior of the prisoners, we also included a group of males with the
same age distribution as the prisoners, recruited from a representative sample of
the Norwegian population.
Group identity has been shown to be important for social preferences in many
contexts (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005; Bernhard, Fehr, and Fischbacher,
2006; Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini, 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Tajfel and
Rurner, 1979), and in-group favoritism could potentially affect the behavior of
the prisoners in the experiment. In addition to single group sessions, where
participants only interacted with participants from their own group, we therefore
included mixed group sessions where the participants interacted with participants
from both groups. This allows us to compare how the prisoners behave when
they interact with prisoners and when they interact with participants from the
benchmark group. The mixed group sessions also allow us to study whether the
benchmark group was prejudiced against the prisoners.
The advantage of a controlled lab experiment in studying the social prefer-
ences of prisoners and the benchmark group is that it allows us to compare their
behavior in similar choice situations. If the circumstances under which the two
groups make their choices are different, which typically would be the case out-
side the lab, it is not possible to say whether differences in pro-social behavior
are a result of differences in circumstances or differences in social preferences.
When circumstances are equalized, however, differences in pro-behavior cannot
be explained by differences in circumstances.1
The main finding in our study is that the prisoners are not immoral in the
sense that they are generally unwilling to act on pro-social preferences. On the
contrary, we find that the prisoners are highly motivated by pro-social prefer-
ences and that there is a striking similarity in the importance the prisoners and
the benchmark group attach to pro-social preferences in both non-strategic and
strategic situations. This is the case both when the prisoners interact with other
prisoners and when they interact with the benchmark group. Thus, we find little
evidence of in-group favoritism. Even if our main finding is the similarity in the
pro-social preferences of the two groups, we find some interesting differences in
how the two groups respond to the punishment option in the trust game. In
1The importance of studying social preferences in a setting where differences in circumstances
are eliminated can be illustrated by the difference in how the participants in the experiment
answered a general trust question and how they answered a specific question about what they
believed others would do in the experiment. In a post experimental questionnaire the share of
participants who answered that people in general could be trusted was twice as high among
the benchmark group as among the prisoners. In contrast, when the participants reported how
much they believed the receivers in the trust game would return to the sender, we did not
find any difference between the two groups, which suggests that the difference in the answers
to the general trust question mainly reflected the fact that the prisoners more often than
the benchmark group find themselves in circumstances where they have to be careful in their
dealings with people.
81
particular we find that the prisoners respond less than the benchmark group to
a perceived increase in the likelihood of punishment.
We cannot exclude the possibility that the prisoners’ behavior in the experi-
ment was affected by the fact that they were imprisoned. The prisoners could, for
example, have been more affected by the scrutiny of the experimental situation
than the benchmark group (Levitt and List, 2007). Special care was, however,
taken to reduce this effect and to make the lab experience as similar as possi-
ble for the two groups. In particular we made sure that no prison guards were
present in the lab during the experiment and at the beginning of the experiment
we explained to the participants the procedures ensuring that it was impossi-
ble for the experimenters, or anyone else, to link subjects to individual choices.
The experiment was furthermore highly incentivized, with an average payment,
excluding show-up fee, of 482 NOK (approximately 85 USD).
Our main result could be seen as providing support to the claim made in
Becker (1968), that criminals do not differ from non-criminals with respect to
their basic motivation and that differences in the costs and benefits from crime
are the main explanation for differences in criminal activity. Given this interpre-
tation, the striking cross-situational differences in the pro-social behavior of the
prisoners inside and outside the lab could reflect that the prisoners face the same
circumstances as the benchmark group in the lab, while the circumstances they
face outside the lab are very different. An alternative interpretation of our main
results, however, is that there is weak cross-situational consistency in social pref-
erences, and that behavior in the lab is motivated by different social preferences
than behavior outside the lab (Levitt and List, 2007).
Section 2 and Section 3 present the sampling procedure and the experimental
design. Section 4 and Section 5 analyze pro-social preferences in the dictator
game and the trust game, respectively. Section 6 discusses some implications of
our findings.
2 Sample
We conducted 12 sessions, which on average lasted 90 minutes, with a total of
360 participants during the period from June 2007 to April 2009. Four sessions,
with a total of 207 participants, were mixed sessions in which the prisoners and
the benchmark group interacted, and eight sessions, with a total of 153 partici-
pants, were single group sessions in which the participants only interacted with
participants from their own group. No individual participated in more than one
session.
The 187 prisoners who participated in the experiment were all male inmates
of Bjørgvin Prison, a medium security prison located outside the city of Bergen,
Norway. The prisoners were invited to participate in the experiment at a meeting
some days in advance of each session. At the meeting we also handed out written
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invitations in which we explained that the experiment was voluntary, that par-
ticipants would not be asked to reveal any personal information, and that any
information gathered in the experiment would be anonymous. They were further-
more informed that in addition to a show-up fee they could earn extra money
during the experiment, that all earnings would be paid in cash immediately after
the experiment, and that they did not have to report their earnings from the
experiment to the prison authorities. At Bjørgvin Prison, the experiment was
conducted in a mobile computer lab that was set up in the prison gymnasium
and no prison guards were present in the lab during the experiment.
The other group of participants consisted of 173 males selected randomly
from the population living in the 27 basic statistical units closest to the Norwe-
gian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH) in Bergen.2 These
basic statistical units include parts of the second largest city in Norway as well
as a less populated rural area, and the population is close to the national average
with respect to the distribution of income, education and occupation. The in-
mates at Bjørgvin prison are on average younger than the general population, and
we stratified the invitations so that the age profile of the benchmark group was
approximately the same as for the prisoners.3 Table 1 reports the characteristics
of the two groups based on self-reported age, education and work experience. We
observe that the two groups are very similar with respect to age and work expe-
rience, but that a somewhat higher share of the benchmark group has completed
secondary education.
[ Table 1 about here. ]
The benchmark group received an invitation letter similar to the one received
by the prisoners and they were given the same instructions during the experi-
ment. These participants conducted the experiment at NHH, where we set up
a computer lab of the same type as the one used in the gymnasium at Bjørgvin
Prison.4
3 Design
The experiment consisted of two parts: a dictator game and a version of the trust
game. It was conducted using a web-based interface and was double blind so
2A basic statistical unit is the smallest geographical unit used by Statistics Norway.
3The selection procedure was approved by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services
(“Norsk samfunnsvitenskaplig datatjeneste”) and the Norwegian Public Register (“Norsk Folk-
eregister”).
4To compensate the benchmark group for the additional time and costs incurred by this
group in order to come to the lab, the show-up fee for the benchmark group, 300 NOK, was
higher than the show-up fee for the prisoners, 100 NOK. The participants were not informed
about the other group’s show-up fee.
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that neither subjects nor experimenters could associate decisions with particular
subjects. No information about the outcome of the dictator game was given to
the participants before both parts of the experiment were completed.
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants were informed about the
rules of conduct and given a description of how the experiment would proceed.5
Instructions were given by the experimenter and on the computer screens. To
prevent participants with poor reading skills from misunderstanding the written
instructions, it was possible to listen to a pre-recorded version of the instruc-
tions using headsets available to all participants. In all the mixed sessions, the
participants were told the location of the other participant, in Bjørgvin Prison
or at NHH, and given a short description of how the participants in the other
location had been recruited, that the participants at Bjørgvin Prison were male
inmates at a medium security prison, and that the participants at NHH were
males recruited from the general population.
In the dictator game, the participants were asked to divide an endowment
of money between themselves and another participant. Each participant made
this decision in two situations and was a recipient in two other situations. In
each situation they were matched with a different participant and they were not
informed about the outcome in the two situations where they were a recipient
before at the end of the session.
The endowment to be distributed by the dictator in the mixed session was 1000
NOK (approximately 175 USD). In the single group session each participant was
a dictator in one situation with an endowment of 1000 NOK and in one situation
with an endowment of 500 NOK. The dictators could give the other participant
six alternative shares of the endowment: 0 percent, 20 percent, 40 percent, 60
percent, 80 percent or 100 percent.
Immediately after the dictator game, the participants took part in one of
two versions of a trust game: a standard trust game or a trust game with a
punishment option. Each participant was involved in four trust situations; first
in two situations as a sender and then in two situations as a receiver, and in
each situation they were given an endowment of 400 NOK (approximately 70
USD). They did not receive any information about the outcome of the first two
situations before they decided how much to return in the situations in which they
were receivers. In each situation they were matched with a different participant.
In the mixed sessions they were matched with one participant from each location,
both as a sender and as a receiver, and the participants knew the location of the
other participant when they made their decisions.
In the standard trust game the senders were given the opportunity to send
up to 200 NOK, choosing among six alternative shares of this amount: 0 percent,
20 percent, 40 percent, 60 percent, 80 percent and 100 percent. The amount
sent was multiplied by a factor of three so that the receiver received three times
5Complete instructions can be downloaded from http://sites.google.com/site/sameos/.
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the sent amount. Before the sender made his choice, he was informed that the
receiver could return six alternative shares of the received amount: 0 percent,
20 percent, 40 percent, 60 percent, 80 percent or 100 percent, and was asked to
report what he believed the probability was that the receiver would return each
of the alternative shares.6 The sender thus had to reflect on how the receiver
would respond to his decisions before he decided what to do.
When the sender had decided how much to send, the receiver was informed
of how much he had received. The receiver then had to decide what share of the
received amount (0 percent, 20 percent, 40 percent, 60 percent, 80 percent or 100
percent) he wanted to return to the other participant.
The trust game with a punishment option was identical to the standard trust
game except that the sender had the option to punish the other participant. In
the mixed sessions, the sender could choose to reduce the other participants’s
payoff by 100 NOK or 200 NOK at a low cost to himself (0.25 NOK per 1 NOK
reduction). In the single group sessions the punishment cost for the sender was
low in one of the situations and high in the other (1 NOK per 1 NOK reduction).
Before the receiver made his choice of how much to return he was asked, for
each possible return amount, to report what he believed the probability was that
the sender would choose to reduce his payment by 0 NOK, 100 NOK or 200
NOK.7 After the receiver had decided how much to return, the sender decided
whether he wanted to punish the receiver by reducing his payment by 100 NOK
or 200 NOK at a cost to himself.
Throughout the experiment, after having made a decision the participants
were immediately shown the consequences of their decision and then asked to
either confirm or revise it. At the end of each part of the experiment, they were
again given the opportunity to revise all of their decisions in that part, and then
asked to make a final confirmation of their decisions.
At the end of the experiment, one of the eight situations each participant was
involved in, four dictator game situations and four trust game situations, was
randomly drawn and the participant received his earnings from this situation
in addition to the show-up fee.8 The average earnings, excluding the show-up
fee, was 482 NOK (approximately 85 USD). Special care was taken so that the
payment procedure ensured anonymity. The computer assigned a payment code
to each of the participants, and a group of assistants, who were not present
in the lab during the experiment, prepared envelopes containing the payments
6In the mixed sessions, the sender was asked to report these beliefs both when the receiver
was a prisoner and when the receiver was from the benchmark group.
7In the mixed sessions the participants answered these questions both when the sender was
a prisoner and when the sender was from the benchmark group, and in the single group sessions
they answered these questions for high and low punishment cost.
8Due to a computer error, five participants in the benchmark group only made one choice
as a dictator and one choice as a sender in the trust game. Total number of observations from
this group is therefore 341 and not 346.
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corresponding to each payment code. The assistants also made sure that it was
impossible to identify the amount of money by simply looking at the envelope.
After bringing the envelopes to the lab, the assistants immediately left and the
envelopes were handed out in accordance with the payment codes. The sequence
of events in the two versions of the experiment is summarized in Table 2.
[ Table 2 about here. ]
4 Social preferences in non-strategic situations
The distributive situation in the dictator game has two important characteristics
that limit the possible motives the dictator may have for sharing. First, the
situation is non-strategic in the sense that the other participant is unable to
respond to the decision made by the dictator, which implies that sharing cannot
be motivated by self-interest. Second, the dictator does not respond to decisions
made by the other participant, which implies that sharing cannot be motivated
by reciprocity. Sharing in the dictator game could, however, be motivated by
both inequality aversion and by altruism.
The upper left panel in Figure 1 provides a histogram of the share given in
situations where prisoners are matched with other prisoners, where we observe
that the large majority gives something to the other participant. Some prisoners
give nothing to the other participant, but the modal choice is to give 40 percent
of the endowment.9 From Table 3 we observe that the prisoners give on average
36.2 percent to the other participant, which is more than commonly reported for
experiments conducted with students (Camerer, 2003).
[ Figure 1 about here. ]
[ Table 3 about here. ]
The dictators were informed about the location of the other participant and
this information could potentially affect their sharing behavior. Prisoners could,
for example, be more willing to act on pro-social preferences when they were
matched with other prisoners than when they were matched with a participant
from the benchmark group. Comparing the upper left and the upper right panels
in Figure 1 we observe, however, that the distribution of shares given is very
similar in the two types of situations. From Table 3 we observe that the prisoners
on average give slightly more to other prisoners than they give to participants
from the benchmark group, but the difference is not significant (p = 0.134).
9There is no significant difference in the average share given when the endowment is 500
NOK and 1000 NOK. The prisoners gave 2.7 percentage points less with the high endowment
than with the low endowment (p = 0.242) and the benchmark group gave 1.2 percentage points
more (p = 0.420).
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Comparing the upper panels and the lower panels in Figure 1 we observe a
striking similarity in the distribution of shares given for the prisoners and the
benchmark group. This impression is confirmed by Table 3 where we find no
significant difference in the average share given (p = 0.273). This similarity in
the share given also holds when we look separately at how much each of the two
groups gives in situations where they are matched with prisoners (p = 0.426),
and in situations where they are matched with the benchmark group (p = 0.601).
Table 4 reports a regression on share given where we control for age, edu-
cation and work experience. The coefficient for the dictator being a prisoner
is insignificant, which confirms the impression that there is no difference in the
weight the two groups attach to pro-social preferences. We also observe that both
groups give somewhat more when the recipient is a prisoner than they do when
the recipient is from the benchmark group, but this is only significant for the
benchmark group.
In sum, we find that the prisoners are highly motivated by pro-social pref-
erences in the dictator game and that there are no differences in the sharing
behavior of the prisoners and the benchmark group. We therefore conclude that
prisoners are not characterized by an unwillingness to act on pro-social prefer-
ences in non-strategic situations, neither in meetings with other prisoners or with
participants from the general population.
5 Social preferences in strategic situations
We now turn to the trust game, which allows us to study the participants’ so-
cial preferences in strategic situations. Since the participants in the trust game
respond to decisions made by other participants and have to take into account
how other participants respond to their decisions, this game introduces motives
that are not present in the dictator game.
The decision to send does not provide a clean measure of pro-social behavior
since it also is affected by beliefs about the other participant’s behavior, and our
analysis therefore focuses on the return decision and on the decision to punish
in the trust game with a punishment option. We observe, however, from Ta-
ble 5, that the average share sent by the prisoners and by the benchmark group
is strikingly similar if we look at all the situations, 62.2 percent versus 64.1 per-
cent. Looking only at the standard trust game, we observe that prisoners send
somewhat less than the benchmark group, in particular when the receiver is a
prisoner, but this difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.183). The share
sent in the standard trust game is often interpreted as a measure of trust (Fehr,
2009), and this result therefore suggests that the two groups are equally trusting
when they make choices in the same circumstances.
[ Table 5 about here. ]
87
5.1 Share returned
Table 6 reports the average share returned in the trust game for the prisoners and
the benchmark group. If we look at the average across all return decisions, the
prisoners return 38.6 percent of the received amount and the benchmark group
returns 41.3 percent. However, since the decision to return in the trust game with
a punishment option might be motivated by a desire to avoid punishment, the
average share returned does not provide a clean measure of pro-social motivation.
In the standard trust game only pro-social preferences can motivate the re-
ceiver to return a share of the received money and we observe that the prisoners
in these situations return close to one third of the money they receive. From
Table 6 we observe that there is no important difference in the average share re-
turned when the sender is a prisoner and when the sender is from the benchmark
group (p = 0.179). Prisoners are thus motivated by pro-social preferences also in
situations where they respond to others decisions.
Comparing the average share returned by the prisoners and the benchmark
group in the standard trust game, we observe from Table 6 that the benchmark
group returns a higher share, but the difference is not statistically significant,
(p = 0.157). Since self-interest cannot explain a positive amount returned, this
result suggests that both groups are equally motivated by pro-social preferences in
their interaction with participants from the benchmark group. When the sender
is a prisoner, however, we observe that the benchmark group return somewhat
more than the prisoners, (p < 0.001).
The trust game with a punishment option introduces an additional motive of
avoiding punishment, a motive that in itself should make the participants more
motivated to return a high share. We observe from Table 6 that the prisoners
return a higher share when there is a punishment option than they do in the
standard trust game, in particular when the cost of punishment is low. For the
benchmark group, we observe no systematic effect of the punishment option,
which may reflect that the presence of a punishment option crowds out the moral
motivation for the benchmark group.
[ Table 6 about here. ]
Is the return decision in the trust game motivated by the same pro-social
preferences that motivated sharing in the standard dictator game? To address this
question, and to study the role of reciprocity and punishment, Table 7a reports
a regression of the share returned by the prisoners in all the return decisions.
To capture the pro-social preferences that motivate the participants in the
dictator game we calculate the amount that each participant has to return in
order to achieve the distribution he selected as a dictator. We define the variable
’Dictator’ as the maximum of this number and zero. 10 This variable is the
10A similar approach is used in Ashraf, Bohnet, and Piankov (2006); Cappelen, Nygaard,
Sørensen, and Tungodden (2010).
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amount the participant would return if he wanted the distribution in the trust
game to be as close as possible to the distribution he chose when he was a dictator,
taking into account that it is impossible to return a negative amount.
From column (5) in Table 7a we observe that the Dictator variable has a
large and significant effect on how much the prisoners return, which suggests
that the pro-social preferences salient in the non-strategic dictator game also are
important motives in the strategic trust game. Table 7b reports the regression
of share returned for the benchmark group and we find that the cross-situational
consistency in pro-social preferences also holds for the benchmark group.
A large body of evidence has shown that many people are willing to reward
kind actions even at a cost to themselves (Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Falk and
Fischbacker, 2006). Reciprocity could potentially be important for the receivers
in the trust game since they are placed in a distributive situation where the sender
may have acted kindly by sending an amount. If the receivers are motivated by
a desire to reciprocate, we would expect the share returned to be increasing in
the share sent. From column (5) in Table 7a we observe, however, that the share
returned by the prisoners is not increasing in the share sent, which suggests that
reciprocity is not an important motive for them in this situation. Comparing
with Table 7b we observe that the same holds for the benchmark group.
A desire to avoid punishment could affect the return decision in the situations
where the sender had a punishment option. In the regression we look at the effect
of the two different punishment options, Low cost and High cost, and the effect of
a marginal increase in the belief that the sender will use the punishment option.
From column (5) in Table 7a we observe that the existence of a punishment
option has a positive effect on the share returned by the prisoners, but this effect
is only significant when the cost is low. We follow the approach of Falk, Meier,
and Zehnder (2011) and use the average expected punishment as a proxy for the
belief that the sender is likely to use the punishment option and we observe that
the coefficient for this ’Belief’ variable is small and insignificant for the prisoners.
This suggests that expectations about punishment are of little importance when
the prisoners decide how much to return.
In contrast to what we find for the prisoners, the benchmark group responds
to the punishment option by reducing how much they return. This suggests that
pro-social motivation of the benchmark group is crowded out by the threat of
punishment. The benchmark group also differ from the prisoners in how they
respond to an increased likelihood that the other participant will use the punish-
ment option. Column (5) in Table 7b shows that Belief has a large and significant
effect on the share returned for the benchmark group (p = 0.001).
From Table 7a and Table 7b we observe that the indicator for sender being
a prisoner is not significant for either group and the interaction terms between
sender being a prisoner and Dictator, Share sent and Beliefs are also insignificant.
In line with the results from the dictator game, we thus find no evidence of in-
group favoritism.
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[ Table 7 about here. ]
In sum, the high average share returned by the receivers in the standard
trust game shows that both the prisoners and the benchmark group are highly
motivated by pro-social preferences. The return decision seems to a large extent
to be motivated by the same pro-social preferences that motivated sharing in the
dictator game. This suggests that social preferences are consistent across very
different economic environments within an experimental setting. Reciprocity does
not seem to be an important motive for either of the two groups. The two groups
differ, however, in how they respond to the punishment option. The existence of
of a punishment option increases the share returned among the prisoners, but it
has a large negative effect on the share returned among the benchmark group.
For both groups, the share returned is higher the more likely the participant think
it is that the punishment option will be used, but this effect is only statistically
significant for the benchmark group. In line with what we found in the dictator
game, there is no evidence of in-group favoritism.
5.2 Punishment
In the previous section we found that reciprocity was of little importance for
both groups when they decided how much of the received money they would
return to the sender. The trust game with a punishment option allows us to
study whether reciprocity is more important in the decision to punish than in
the return decision. The punishment option is also interesting because it creates
a situation where inequality aversion might conflict with altruism. Punishment
can, when the cost of punishment is low, equalize the final income distribution
and inequality averse participants therefore have a motive to punish.11 Altruism
would, however, be a reason not to punish because punishment reduces the income
of the other participant.
None of the participants choose to punish the receiver when the cost of pun-
ishment is high. From Table 8, we observe, however, that when the cost of pun-
ishment is low, 21.5 percent of the prisoners choose to punish and their average
punishment is 34 NOK. For the benchmark group the corresponding numbers are
23.8 percent and 39.2 NOK. Even if there is no significant difference in the average
levels of punishment, the two groups differ with regard to who they punish.
[ Table 8 about here. ]
Table 9 reports marginal effects for a probit regression on the decision to
punish when the punishment cost is low and it allows us to study how different
11This is not the case when the cost of punishment is high, in which case the level of inequality
is unaffected by the level of punishment.
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motives affect the decision to punish.12 If reciprocity is an important motive
in the punishment decision we would expect the participants to be more likely
to punish when the share returned is low. From Table 9 we observe that this
indeed is the case. Both prisoners and the benchmark group are significantly
less likely to punish if the receiver returns a high share of the received amount
(p < 0.001). Reciprocity is thus an important motive for both groups when they
decide whether or not to punish.
In the dictator game, inequality aversion and altruism are both motives for
sharing. With respect to punishment, however, these motives pull in opposite
directions. The correlation between pro-social behavior in the dictator game and
punishment in the trust game will therefore depend on the relative importance
of these two motives in the dictator decision. In Table 9 “Dictator” is defined
as the punishment that is required in order to come as close as possible to the
distribution the participant selected as a dictator. We observe that the Dictator
variable has a large negative effect on punishment for the prisoners (p = 0.031).
In contrast, the Dictator variable has no effect on punishment for the benchmark
group (p = 0.838). There are two plausible interpretations of this difference
between the two groups. First, it could be seen as suggesting that the prisoners
place less weight on inequality aversion relative to altruism than the benchmark
group. However, it could also be seen as suggesting that the prisoners view
punishment as a more anti-social act than the benchmark group, and that they
therefore are more reluctant to punish if they are highly motivated by pro-social
preferences.
The prisoners are less likely to punish other prisoners than participants from
the benchmark group, while the benchmark group is more likely to punish prison-
ers than members of their own group, but when we control for background vari-
ables and other motives these effects are not significant (p = 0.103 and p = 0.332
respectively).
[ Table 9 about here. ]
In sum, we find that the prisoners are not characterized by being more willing
to punish others than the benchmark group. In contrast to what we find for the
decision to return, reciprocity is an important motive in the punishment decision
for both groups. For the prisoners there is strong negative correlation between
pro-social behavior in the dictator game and the willingness to punish, but there
is no such correlation for the benchmark group. One interpretation of this result is
that prisoners perceive punishment as a more anti-social act than the benchmark
group.
12OLS regressions give very similar results.
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6 Conclusion
The results from the experiment presented in this paper suggest that prisoners are
not immoral in the sense that they are characterized by a general unwillingness
to act on pro-social preferences. On the contrary, we find no major differences in
the pro-social preferences of the prisoners and a benchmark group recruited from
the general population when they face the same circumstances. Importantly, this
result is not driven by in-group favoritism among the prisoners.
The main differences we find between the prisoners and the benchmark group
in our experiment are related to the punishment option in the trust game. We
find that prisoners increase their pro-social behavior when the punishment option
is introduced, but that they do not respond to an increase in expected punish-
ment. The benchmark group, in contrast, decreases their pro-social behavior
when the punishment option is introduced, but responds strongly to an increase
in expected punishment. For the prisoners we also find that there is a strong
negative correlation between pro-social behavior in the dictator game and their
willingness to punish, but we find no such correlation for the benchmark group.
This result might suggest that prisoners view punishment as a more anti-social
act than the benchmark group.
If social preferences were important in explaining criminal behavior we would
expect prisoners on average to be less motivated by pro-social preferences than
the benchmark group in our experiment. In contrast, we find a striking similarity
between pro-social motivation of the two groups in the experiment. We consider
two plausible interpretations of this result. One interpretation is that there is
weak cross-situational consistency in social preferences and that our results there-
fore cannot be extrapolated from the experimental setting to the world outside
the lab. Interestingly, however, we find considerable consistency in pro-social
behavior across different situations in our experiment, but we cannot exclude the
possibility that such consistency does not apply when we move out of the lab.
An alternative interpretation of our results is that social preferences are of
little importance in explaining criminal behavior and that differences in criminal
behavior primarily are a result of differences in circumstances. This interpretation
evokes a puzzle in light of the fact that pro-social preferences seem to be important
in many other contexts where people make decisions. One explanation for this
puzzle could be that criminal behavior to a large extent is caused by lack of self-
control, a view common among criminologists (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990).
If this is the case, criminals can be highly motivated by pro-social preferences
in situations where they have self-control, but sometimes be unable to act on
these preferences because they lose their self-control. An interesting avenue for
further research is to investigate the interaction between social preferences and
self-control in explaining criminal behavior.
A related issue for further research is whether there are systematic differences
in the social preferences of different types of criminals. In order to secure the
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complete anonymity of the prisoners we did not ask them about what type of
crime they had committed. We can therefore not rule out that particular groups
of criminals are characterized by attaching little importance to pro-social pref-
erences. It could, for example, be the case that prisoners who are convicted of
crimes that require pre-meditation, such as certain types of white-collar crime,
are characterized by being less motivated by pro-social preferences than other
criminals.
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Figure 1: Histograms of share given
Note: Share given is the share of the endowment given to the other participant in
the dictator game. “A, B” should be read as the situations where a participant
from subject group A decides how much to give to a participant from subject
group B.
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Table 1: Sample characteristics
Prisoners Benchmark
Above 25 years old 0.764 0.774
(0.031) (0.032)
Completed secondary school 0.631 0.879
(0.035) (0.025)
At least five years work experience 0.727 0.722
(0.037) (0.034)
n 187 173
Note: Self-reported age, education and work experience. Standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 2: Sequence of events
Stage of experiment T1 T2
1. Decisions to share in dictator game yes yes
2. Beliefs about share returned in trust game yes yes
3. Decisions to send in trust game yes yes
4. Beliefs about punishment in trust game no yes
5. Decisions to return in trust game yes yes
6. Decisions to punish in trust game no yes
7. One situation drawn for payment yes yes
Note: Sequence of events in the experiment. T1: the standard trust game; T2:
trust game with a punishment option.
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Table 3: Average share given in the dictator game
Receiver
Sender Prisoner Benchmark All
Prisoner 0.370 0.342 0.362
(0.014) (0.020) (0.013)
n 268 106 374
Benchmark 0.384 0.322 0.340
(0.023) (0.015) (0.015)
n 101 240 341
Note: The table reports average share given in the dictator game, standard errors
(in parentheses) are corrected for clustering on individuals, and n is the number
of observations.
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Table 4: Regressions of share given
Prisoner Benchmark All
Dictator is prisoner 0.008
(0.022)
Other participant is prisoner 0.032 0.060 0.046
(0.019) (0.021) (0.014)
Age 0.010 0.102 0.037
(0.032) (0.057) (0.028)
Education 0.020 0.011 0.020
(0.027) (0.040) (0.023)
Work experience 0.040 -0.030 0.024
(0.029) (0.053) (0.026)
Constant 0.290 0.254 0.263
(0.035) (0.047) (0.032)
Observations 374 341 715
R2 0.019 0.046 0.028
Note: Regression of share given in the dictator game on background variables.
Age, Education and Work experience are indicator variables taking the value
one when age is above 25 years, when secondary education is completed, and
when work experience is at least five years. The left column is based on all
situations where the dictator is a prisoner, the middle column is based on all
situations where a participant from the benchmark group is a dictator, and the
right column is based on all situations. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
corrected for clustering on individuals.
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Table 7: Regressions of share returned
(a) Prisoners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dictator 0.574 0.674
(0.113) (0.127)
Share sent 0.056 -0.149
(0.057) (0.084)
Beliefs 0.013 0.051
(0.064) (0.065)
Sender is prisoner 0.007 -0.040
(0.026) (0.079)
Dictator X sender is prisoner -0.013 -0.084
(0.104) (0.140)
Share sent X sender is prisoner 0.023 0.102
(0.036) (0.104)
Beliefs X sender is prisoner -0.017 -0.041
(0.043) (0.060)
Low cost 0.117 0.123 0.120 0.122 0.092
(0.033) (0.037) (0.055) (0.037) (0.046)
High cost 0.079 0.074 0.078 0.073 0.062
(0.044) (0.048) (0.061) (0.048) (0.053)
Age -0.014 -0.013 -0.017 -0.017 -0.019
(0.039) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.039)
Education 0.036 0.041 0.038 0.039 0.037
(0.031) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.031)
Work experience 0.012 0.033 0.040 0.039 0.014
(0.033) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.033)
Constant 0.202 0.237 0.287 0.281 0.278
(0.048) (0.058) (0.049) (0.054) (0.083)
Observations 343 343 343 343 343
R2 0.206 0.066 0.058 0.058 0.215
Continued on next page.
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Table 7: Regressions of share returned (continued)
(b) Benchmark
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dictator 0.645 0.783
(0.090) (0.122)
Share sent -0.009 -0.137
(0.054) (0.070)
Beliefs 0.188 0.204
(0.081) (0.062)
Sender is prisoner 0.071 0.124
(0.027) (0.081)
Dictator X sender is prisoner 0.081 -0.109
(0.120) (0.220)
Share sent X sender is prisoner 0.056 -0.047
(0.035) (0.122)
Beliefs X sender is prisoner 0.004 -0.046
(0.041) (0.060)
Low cost 0.044 0.027 -0.118 0.025 -0.109
(0.035) (0.042) (0.084) (0.042) (0.060)
High cost -0.042 -0.085 -0.234 -0.074 -0.183
(0.053) (0.057) (0.077) (0.056) (0.060)
Age -0.082 -0.034 -0.060 -0.033 -0.119
(0.057) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.052)
Education -0.051 0.000 0.021 -0.003 -0.027
(0.049) (0.051) (0.048) (0.049) (0.045)
Work experience 0.210 0.166 0.152 0.166 0.202
(0.051) (0.058) (0.056) (0.056) (0.046)
Constant 0.234 0.310 0.328 0.296 0.302
(0.052) (0.062) (0.059) (0.059) (0.061)
Observations 320 320 320 320 320
R2 0.275 0.076 0.100 0.084 0.338
Note: Regression of share returned in the trust game. “Dictator” is the share
the participant has to return in order to come as close as possible to the distribu-
tion chosen in the dictator game. “Beliefs” is the average expected punishment
measured in units of 100 NOK. “Low cost” and “high cost” refer to the price of
punishment in the trust game with a punishment option. “Sender is prisoner” is
an indicator variable taking the value one if the sender is a prisoner, “Age” is an
indicator variable taking the value one if age is above 25 years, “Education” is
an indicator variable taking the value one if secondary school is completed, and
“Work experience” is an indicator variable taking the value one if work experience
is at least five years. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering
on individuals.
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Table 8: Average punishment
Share that punishes Punishment in NOK
Receiver Receiver
Sender All Prisoner Benchmark All Prisoner Benchmark
Prisoners 0.215 0.160 0.309 34.23 23.40 52.73
(0.038) (0.038) (0.063) (6.43) (5.94) (11.22)
n 149 94 55 149 94 55
Benchmark 0.238 0.278 0.213 39.16 42.59 37.08
(0.040) (0.061) (0.044) (6.90) (10.06) (7.89)
n 143 54 89 143 54 89
Note: Share of participants who punish and average punishment in NOK by
receiver type. n is the number of situations with low price of punishment and
where a positive amount was sent. Standard errors (in parentheses) corrected for
clustering on individuals.
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Table 9: Regression of punishment
A: Prisoners
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dictator -0.494 -0.685
(0.237) (0.241)
Share returned -0.374 -0.586
(0.112) (0.159)
Receiver is prisoner -0.136 -0.203
(0.064) (0.148)
Share returned X Receiver is prisoner -0.221 0.146
(0.090) (0.216)
Age 0.123 0.167 0.131 0.132
(0.068) (0.063) (0.069) (0.059)
Education 0.140 0.147 0.147 0.119
(0.069) (0.071) (0.069) (0.070)
Work experience -0.181 -0.195 -0.203 -0.159
(0.105) (0.108) (0.103) (0.101)
Observations 148 148 148 148
log likelihood -69.803 -63.336 -70.597 -57.653
B: Benchmark
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dictator 0.258 -0.046
(0.256) (0.226)
Share returned -0.872 -0.804
(0.173) (0.173)
Receiver is prisoner 0.059 0.105
(0.068) (0.112)
Share returned X Receiver is prisoner 0.155 -0.067
(0.166) (0.277)
Age 0.032 -0.036 0.052 -0.044
(0.118) (0.134) (0.111) (0.140)
Education 0.124 0.125 0.120 0.121
(0.118) (0.067) (0.120) (0.067)
Work experience -0.022 0.074 -0.028 0.081
(0.115) (0.098) (0.113) (0.097)
Observations 142 142 142 142
log likelihood -76.695 -55.886 -77.020 -55.481
Note: Marginal effects from a probit model where the outcome is whether there
is any punishment. Only run on observations with low price. “Dictator” is the
punishment, measured in units of 100 NOK, that would implement the mean dis-
tribution chosen in the dictator game. Standard errors (in parentheses) corrected
for clustering on individuals.
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